SINGAPORE'S HIDDEN OIL BUFFER: WHY A HORMUZ CRISIS ISN'T WHAT IT SEEMS
Singapore does not produce a single drop of oil. Yet it punches way above its weight in global oil trade. It is disproportionately influential, especially in pricing, storage and trading flows. It is one of the few places where physical oil flows, financial trading and legal infrastructure all intersect. Singapore's ranking in the world of oil:
- Amongst the top 4 oil trading centres in the world, together with Geneva, London and Houston.
- Undisputed #1 oil hub in Asia
- World's largest bunkering (ship refuelling) port.
- Amongst the top 3 largest refining centers in the world.
- Major price-discovery centre for refined oil products.
Singapore has a “small country, big footprint” story in energy, similar to how it excels in finance, aviation, or maritime services. This hub status in energy provides Singapore a unique dimension which influences policy in a supply crisis in ways many in the public may not be fully aware.
Internet chatter is loud criticising the stand of the Foreign Minister on the Hormuz Strait blockade. The general sentiment is Singapore should negotiate with Iran, just like our neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia. I had written about how the government reacts to crisis is time dependent (see here). Recent events bear me out with the deliverance by US battleships and Iran now is close-open-close mode depending on leadership mood of the moment. US battleships are now in Hormuz and things should be changing. The situation is still fluid, but for now, the idea of a direct negotiation seems ill-advised in hindsight and Singapore retains dignity with inaction.
A point consistently made by those calling the government to bow to Iran is the eroding purchasing power of ordinary Singaporeans. Let's have oil flow to Singapore un-interrupted so the cost of bread does not skyrocket. The hearts are in the right place, but the logic is wrong. Having the barrels of crude physically available do not insulate Singapore from global price spikes. Singapore is a price-taker in the international crude oil and refined products markets. Supply in this case, does not equate to price control in Singapore. We may have the supply, but the price of oil is the dictate of the international crude oil market. The call for appeasement with Iran in order to ensure supply and minimise inflation is well-intentioned but fundamentally flawed.
A point consistently made by those calling the government to bow to Iran is the eroding purchasing power of ordinary Singaporeans. Let's have oil flow to Singapore un-interrupted so the cost of bread does not skyrocket. The hearts are in the right place, but the logic is wrong. Having the barrels of crude physically available do not insulate Singapore from global price spikes. Singapore is a price-taker in the international crude oil and refined products markets. Supply in this case, does not equate to price control in Singapore. We may have the supply, but the price of oil is the dictate of the international crude oil market. The call for appeasement with Iran in order to ensure supply and minimise inflation is well-intentioned but fundamentally flawed.
A country's response is fundamentally shaped by its expectations of duration. A rush to make commitments under pressure can quickly turn into strategic constraints. Short-lived disruptions call for tactical adjustments. Because once you lock into a deal during a crisis, you lose flexibility. And if the situation stabilises faster than expected, you have committed at the worst possible time.
A response to an expected long-lived crisis depends on how well a country has prepared for such a crisis. Singapore's vulnerability as a small island state with no hinterland and resources, have made "preparedness" a doctrine for survival.
- In times of peace, prepare for war (have well-equipped military assets).
- In times of financial stability, prepare for fiscal stress (have strong financial reserves).
- In times of plentiful, prepare for scarcity (have reserves for essentials - food, fuel, sand, water).
The core triad is -- military, financial, and physical essentials. The idea of “reserves” is much broader: not just stockpiles, but buffers of capability, redundancy, optionality, legislation, systems, infrastructures, operating mechanisms. .
In social media commentaries regarding the Hormuz blockade crisis, I have made comments that Singaporeans who subscribe to pleading to Iran does not fully understand our resilience to oil supply shock. Singapore's posture comes from weighing reserves over time duration. And that comes down to something we don't fully see -- our actual reserves. The government knows exactly how much buffer we have. The public doesn't. Folks mistake posture for inertia.
Competence is silent; failure is theatricalIn political economy, there is something called the "public goods problem". When something works well (clean water, stable currency, public transport, etc) it's collectively enjoyed but individually under-credited. People only mobilise when the good is threatened or degraded. In simple colloquial terms, when things work, we get free-riders - diam diam, bo-chap; when things fail - kow peh kow bu.
Singapore is a non-oil producing country, but it has strong resilience to supply shock due to its position as a major oil refinery, one of the biggest oil trading hub in the world, important bunkering services as a major port, and behind the scenes foresight and planning by the government.
IEA (International Energy Agency) countries maintain oil reserves by legally requiring industry to hold stocks or by storing government-controlled strategic stocks, equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports. Only a few IEA members have government-owned stockpiles of oil reserves. The US have federal-government owned stockpiles of oil reserves kept in 4 SPRs (Strategic Petroleum Reserves) which are salt-covered underground caverns.
Singapore is not a IEA country so we do not follow them and adopt across the board mandatory requirement for 90 days stockpiles. Neither do we follow the US system of SPRs. Singapore’s oil reserves system is distributed across government-owned strategic elements, mandatory industry holdings, and large volumes of commercial/trading stocks.
Singapore's strategic reserves focus on the fuel/energy side (crude + refined petroleum products, with a strong emphasis on diesel and LNG/gas for power security). They support both immediate domestic needs and the continuity of the refining hub itself.
Government-Owned Strategic Reserves
The Singapore government maintains state-owned stockpiles of crude and refined petroleum products. It does not publish information about this strategic reserves for security reasons. With no line descriptions in budget statements, there is no way to back-calculate the strategic reserve holdings. The only piece of volume data goes back to 2013 often-quoted report of approximately 32 million barrels of crude oil + 65 million barrels of refined petroleum products. This data is now far outdated. It remains a guessing game.
The layer of crude serves a dual purpose:
The Singapore government maintains state-owned stockpiles of crude and refined petroleum products. It does not publish information about this strategic reserves for security reasons. With no line descriptions in budget statements, there is no way to back-calculate the strategic reserve holdings. The only piece of volume data goes back to 2013 often-quoted report of approximately 32 million barrels of crude oil + 65 million barrels of refined petroleum products. This data is now far outdated. It remains a guessing game.
The layer of crude serves a dual purpose:
1. Protect the economic engine -- Singapore's refining, petrochemical, bunkering, and trading activities are major contributors to GDP and jobs on Jurong Island. Letting refineries shut down completely would cause broader economic damage far beyond just petrol at the pump.
2. National resilience -- It provides time to diversify supplies without panic.
Refined pertroleum products are fuels and energy products produced directly by oil refineries from crude oil through distillation, cracking, and blending. They consist of:
Government strategic reserves form the last defence in a supply crisis. In the current oil crisis, Tan See Leng (Minister for Manpower cum Minister-in-charge of Energy and Science & Technology) has mentioned that the strategic reserves have not been touched.
Where these reserves are kept are not publicly disclosed for security reasons. But certainly they are dispersed amongst on ground tank farms in Jurong Island and Pulau Bukom and in the Jurong Underground Cavern. The cavern can hold about 600 Olympic-sized swimming pools of crude/petroleum products, roughly 9 million barrels. It has taken 14 years in the planning and construction and became operational in 2024. So, far from doing nothing, the government has increased storage capacity significantly.
Refined pertroleum products are fuels and energy products produced directly by oil refineries from crude oil through distillation, cracking, and blending. They consist of:
1. Diesel (and sometimes fuel oil) -- for electricity backup and dual-fuel switching at power plants.
2. Gasoline (petrol), jet fuel/kerosene -- for transportation.
3. Gas oil -- for cooking.
3. Gas oil -- for cooking.
4. Some heavier residues or intermediates that can be used directly or further processed.
Government strategic reserves form the last defence in a supply crisis. In the current oil crisis, Tan See Leng (Minister for Manpower cum Minister-in-charge of Energy and Science & Technology) has mentioned that the strategic reserves have not been touched.
Where these reserves are kept are not publicly disclosed for security reasons. But certainly they are dispersed amongst on ground tank farms in Jurong Island and Pulau Bukom and in the Jurong Underground Cavern. The cavern can hold about 600 Olympic-sized swimming pools of crude/petroleum products, roughly 9 million barrels. It has taken 14 years in the planning and construction and became operational in 2024. So, far from doing nothing, the government has increased storage capacity significantly.
Singapore's Domestic Needs
Singapore's daily crude consumption is about 1.1 to 1.5 million bpd. Refiners output in various refined petroleum is slightly less which are for --
1. A major part of about 65% is for marine bunkering (Singapore is the world’s largest bunkering).
1. A major part of about 65% is for marine bunkering (Singapore is the world’s largest bunkering).
2. Domestic inland use (transport, industry, petrochemical feedstock, power backup)
3. Exports and re-exports of refined products
In a supply crisis, refiners tend to first cut-back on production. But it would be to a level that still support domestic consumption (bunkering and domestic inland use). and refiners commercial commitments. This is the current status almost 2 months into the Hormuz Strait blockade.
Local inland needs (petrochemical feedstock, jet fuel for Changi, road transport, etc.) are modest (about 300k to 500k bpd) compared with the refinery hub's normal throughput. These are covered comfortably even with reduced runs, thanks to refined product stocks and direct imports if needed. There are no physical shortages -- the airport is still running efficiently, trains and busses still moving smoothly. our lights are still on.
Bunkering Needs
Singapore is #1 in the world for bunkering volume, a position it has held for decades. The annual turnover of marine oil is about 45-55 million tones, way ahead of ports like Fujairah, Rotterdam or Hongkong. This is due to Singapore being a major port and its situation at a choke point of Malacca where shipping traffic is extremely high.
Daily turnover is about 1.1 million bpd and the suppliers maintain about 5 to 20 days buffer. Bunker commercial operating level is high because this is a very liquidity-critical business. It is a very short-cycle, high-turnover business, and in Singapore's case, they are strategically large because it is the world's top bunkering port. On average there is about 14 million barrels of operating buffer stocks. The operators rely on the refineries and direct import to maintain efficient flows. Government strategic reserves is the last line of defence. Today, refineries and imports are still able to maintain the flow and state-reserves have not been tapped.
Bunker oil is one of the few discretionary buffers. Power generation and local transport must run or our economy stops, Aviation must strategically be protected. But shipping can slow steam, reroute or refuel elsewhere. That means bunker demand will be the first to adjust when when stress appears. That means bunker is the first place stress shows up, and one of the first buffers policymakers can squeeze.
Bunker oil comes in several grades. They can be diverted to other uses, or refined into other petroleum products. In the event of a serious supply crisis, Singapore's position as a major bunkering hub means :
(1) there is a huge buffer of bunker oil that can be re-allocated to other domestic uses.
(2) refineries huge daily production serves, in terms of volume, the bunker trade, exports, and domestic inland needs which is comparatively small. Since bunker is discretionary, and so is export, refineries' capacity provides Singapore yet another layer of reserves potential that almost no other country has.
Singapore is #1 in the world for bunkering volume, a position it has held for decades. The annual turnover of marine oil is about 45-55 million tones, way ahead of ports like Fujairah, Rotterdam or Hongkong. This is due to Singapore being a major port and its situation at a choke point of Malacca where shipping traffic is extremely high.
Daily turnover is about 1.1 million bpd and the suppliers maintain about 5 to 20 days buffer. Bunker commercial operating level is high because this is a very liquidity-critical business. It is a very short-cycle, high-turnover business, and in Singapore's case, they are strategically large because it is the world's top bunkering port. On average there is about 14 million barrels of operating buffer stocks. The operators rely on the refineries and direct import to maintain efficient flows. Government strategic reserves is the last line of defence. Today, refineries and imports are still able to maintain the flow and state-reserves have not been tapped.
Bunker oil is one of the few discretionary buffers. Power generation and local transport must run or our economy stops, Aviation must strategically be protected. But shipping can slow steam, reroute or refuel elsewhere. That means bunker demand will be the first to adjust when when stress appears. That means bunker is the first place stress shows up, and one of the first buffers policymakers can squeeze.
Bunker oil comes in several grades. They can be diverted to other uses, or refined into other petroleum products. In the event of a serious supply crisis, Singapore's position as a major bunkering hub means :
(1) there is a huge buffer of bunker oil that can be re-allocated to other domestic uses.
(2) refineries huge daily production serves, in terms of volume, the bunker trade, exports, and domestic inland needs which is comparatively small. Since bunker is discretionary, and so is export, refineries' capacity provides Singapore yet another layer of reserves potential that almost no other country has.
Oil Refinery
Singapore is one of the top refinery centres in the world and that offers certain advantages in a oil supply crisis that most countries do not have.
Refiners SOP in a supply crisis:-
1.Ordinarily, refiners maintain operational stocks of crude oil for one to two weeks. This is their first line of defence.
2. First draw down these operational stocks. They do not fully deplete these stocks. Refiners always keep a minimum operating level (often called "tank bottoms" or safety/heel inventory) to prevent equipment issues, contamination risks, or the high cost of restarting from empty. Drawing below a certain threshold would risk shutting down units, which is expensive and time-consuming.
3. They seek alternative supply source. (e.g., from the US, Africa, or other sources, which take 1–2 months to reroute).
4. Bid competitively for spot delivery from Singapore oil trading hub's liquidity float (see below).
5. Optimisation of production levels. This is exactly what occurred in March–April 2026 - refineries cut utilization (ExxonMobil to about 50% or lower, SRC to about 60%) to avoid running out prematurely while waiting for alternative crudes. They cut down to levels sufficient for domestic needs as well as to meet their obligations to committed deliveries.
5. Refiners coordinate with government to draw on state reserves.
The government's strategic crude reserves is the final layer of defence for refinery sector. The refining hub itself is a strategic asset for Singapore. Releasing or coordinating crude access helps maintain exports, bunkering, and regional supply reliability. Singapore is not an oil producing country and many folks were surprised why Australia signed a pact with us to ensure it's supply. Australia is a major importer of Singapore's refined oil. Singapore's crude reserve strategy is reputational preservation as one of the world's important refinery hub.
In the current crisis, refiners have been dipping into their buffers and commercial inventories while optimizing runs and sourcing replacements. There is no report that indicates they have been forced to near-zero levels. Dr Tan has mentioned almost 2 months into the blockade, state's strategic crude reserves have not been drawn down.
In the current crisis, refiners have been dipping into their buffers and commercial inventories while optimizing runs and sourcing replacements. There is no report that indicates they have been forced to near-zero levels. Dr Tan has mentioned almost 2 months into the blockade, state's strategic crude reserves have not been drawn down.
Commercial Operating Buffers For Domestic Inland Use
Town gas is piped and supplied on demand by City Energy drawing from SLNG. LNG cylinder gas and jet fuel are supplied by various commercial parties that maintain only operating buffers of just several days. Petrol station operators maintain only operating stocks of at most up to 2 weeks. These businesses do not hold reserves but rely on refineries to manage supply flows. Almost 2 months into the Hormuz Strait blockage, there has been no shortage reported.
Power Generation
95% of Singapore's electricity comes from gas fuel generation. Of this, about 50%-60% comes from Natural Gas piped from Indonesia and Malaysia. (This used to be 85% but supply has decreased over the years). The balance is LPG supplied by SNLG, which is again, a long-term government plan which has come to fruition since.
95% of Singapore's electricity comes from gas fuel generation. Of this, about 50%-60% comes from Natural Gas piped from Indonesia and Malaysia. (This used to be 85% but supply has decreased over the years). The balance is LPG supplied by SNLG, which is again, a long-term government plan which has come to fruition since.
Total gas demand for power generation is about 30 million m3/day.
Gas pipeline provides about 16-18 million m3/day.
Thus LNG covers the balance of 12-14 million m3/day.
The 4 tanks at SLNG terminal can theoretically hold 430 million m3.
SLNG is constantly drawn and replenished.
Without replenishment SLNG buffer will run out in 30 to 35 days.
SLNG also provides town gas to City Energy but this is not significant.
The first defence in supply crisis is the 30-35 days buffer SLNG provide. This gives some time to arrange alternative sources. Singapore's LNG source is deliberately diversified. SLNG's long-term contract is with Qatar, with US growing importance in spot cargoes, some from Brunei and Russia. Australia is a large LNG exporter to Asia. There are other spot-market suppliers.
Most Singapore power plants are CCGT types which can fire up with gas or diesel. This is not by chance, but by system design planned long ago. CCGTs use gas but can do quick switch to diesel. Power generation companies are obligated to stockpile 90 days of diesel. This is the second layer of defence.
The third layer of defence is the state-owned strategic reserves of diesel. This has not been touched so far.
Far from doing nothing as critics claimed, in the midst of this supply crisis, Singapore has signed a pact with Australia to stabilise LNG supply. It has also procured from Mozambique. The government has planned for a second SLNG terminal which will increase natural gas buffer stocks significantly in future.
The Oil Trade
Singapore is one of the top oil trading hubs in the world, and the most important one in Asia-Pacific region. Almost all the important oil-trading firms has an office in Singapore. This means Singapore is deeply plugged into the oil ecosystem and intricate network. In the event of a supply crisis, it is relatively easier for Singapore to link up alternate supplies.
Singapore's resilience during supply shocks is the speed at which it can reprice, reroute, and reallocate flowsThis is something that few outside of the industry actually understands. It's a very complicated business but let me try to conceptualise Singapore's role and you can see how this plays into a unique advantage during a very serious supply crisis.
Oil traders hold large volumes of crude and refined products in onshore tanks, floating storage (tankers anchored off Singapore), and cargoes in transit. These inventories are continuously reshuffled through trading and arbitrage, making Singapore not just a physical hub, but a dynamic buffer system in global oil flows. This forms a layered inventory ecosystem.
This oil is not static, not stored for safety, but continuously turning over. It functions as a liquidity hub for oil.
Arbitrage drives the movement or flow of oil. The key drivers that cause arbitrage (price differential) opportunities are - price spreads (Brent vs Dubai vs regional products); freight costs and refinery margins. This causes the movement of cargoes -- it arrives, stored briefly, rerouted or processed, then leave again.
Another way to phrase it is -- Singapore functions as a high-throughput oil liquidity node, where inventories are temporarily concentrated, transformed, and redistributed through trading and arbitrage. It is not a stockpile -- it is a circulating buffer system embedded in global trade flows.
These are commercial buffers. The inventories are held by private operators. They are responsive to price and risk signals. The cargoes can be redirected mid-journey, has multiple supply origins (Atlantic, Middle East, regional). Global hub redundancy (Singapore, Rotterdam, Fujairag, etc) helps provide the global oil liquidity.
Singapore's resilience to oil shocks does not come from holding large strategic reserves, but from its role as a global oil liquidity hub, where private inventories, transit cargoes, and floating storage create a flexible buffer that can absorb and redistribute supply disruptions through arbitrage and rerouting.
These inventories in Singapore's oil ecosystem are not part of our state reserves, but in a disruption they can be partially reallocated or prioritised for Singapore's critical needs through regulatory, contractual and market mechanisms. This forms yet another layer of defence for Singapore, one that is not available to most other countries.
How much of this stocks are we talking about?
These inventories are in onshore tank farms, floating storage (tankers anchored nearby) and inbound redirectable cargoes (not physically in Singapore but within its pull radius). Some estimates put this at 60 to 120 million barrels. Not all of these can be pulled into use for domestic stability as some have been contracted, there are competition from other buyers, and some are needed for operational constraints. The practical influenceable buffer that Singapore can use is probably about 30 to 50 million barrels. This volume can provide about 2-4 weeks cover for bunker and other domestic inland use. This adds yet another layer of buffer that most other countries do not have.
The Legislation
"Marshalling" refers to the government organising, directing, and controlling resources for a specific purpose, usually during a crisis. It is "commanding" not "commandeering". The government can do this under 3 pieces of legislation:
- The Electricity Act mandates Gencos to maintain specific levels of oil fuel stockpiles (currently 60 to 90 days) as part of their licensing requirements.
- Control of Essential Supplies Act 1973 empowers the government to take possession of controlled articles (which can include fuel and petroleum products) to ensure they are placed on the market or used for national needs.
- Requisition of Resources Act (RORA) allows the government to requisition (take temporary or permanent control of) almost any physical resource during an emergency (Vehicles, heavy machinery, specialized tools, buildings, and even land).
Instead of doing nothing, the government has all angles covered, including the legal aspects.
Why The World Watches Singapore
The world watches Singapore during the oil supply crisis not for its political speeches but for the behavioural signals in the physical market.
Singapore is a real-time dashboard of the Asian oil systemWhat happens in Singapore is followed closely because it is:
- a pricing hub (bnechmarks for Asian fuels)
- a logistics hub (a storage and shipping node)
- a trading hub (where arbirtage decisions are made)
- a processing hub (major refining centre.)
The flow signals tells whether supply is flowing normally -- watch out for tankers arrivals/congestion; ship-to-ship transfers; floating storage; cargo diversion into or away from Singapore.
Refinery behaviour tells whether crude availability is tightening -- refinery utilisation rate; unplanned run cuts; crude slate changes.
Price signals tells whether market is stressed -- MOPS (Mean of Platts Singapore) local fuel benchmarks; spot premiums for prompt cargoes; crack spreads.
Inventory behaviour tells is the system drawing down its buffer -- tank levels; floating storage; how fast cargoes are being turned around.
Bunkering behaviour tells is Singapore still serving the world, or turning inward -- bunker volumes; customer priorisation; pricing vs other ports.
Policy and procurement tells what authorities believe about duration risks -- emergency cargo purchases; diversification moves; subtle regulatory nudges.
Unlike other countries that rely on large strategic reserves, Singapore sits at the intersection of flows -- where crude arrives, is processed, priced and distributed across Asia. Traders and analysts track tanker movements, refinery utilisation, price behaviour, inventory turnover and bunkering activity. Together, these reveal whether oil is still flowing smoothly or beginning to strain. When flows are uninterrupted and arbitrage is functioning, Singapore behaves like a neutral conduit. When stress builds, its behaviour changes -- cargoes get rerouted, refiners adjust runs, and prices begin to reflect tighter prompt supply.
What makes Singapore especially important is the layer of commercial liquidity embedded in its system. Large volumes of crude and refined products are constantly in circulation. These are not strategic reserves but form a flexible buffer that can be redirected through price signals and trading activity. In the early stages of a disruption, this buffer absorbs shock and buys time, allowing supply chains to adjust without immediate breakdown.
What is Singapore's signal so far? It points to precaution rather than panic. There is no clear evidence of systemic stress -- no large-scale inventory drawdowns, no sustained scramble for prompt cargoes, no visible prioritisation away from global market functions.
- a processing hub (major refining centre.)
The flow signals tells whether supply is flowing normally -- watch out for tankers arrivals/congestion; ship-to-ship transfers; floating storage; cargo diversion into or away from Singapore.
Refinery behaviour tells whether crude availability is tightening -- refinery utilisation rate; unplanned run cuts; crude slate changes.
Price signals tells whether market is stressed -- MOPS (Mean of Platts Singapore) local fuel benchmarks; spot premiums for prompt cargoes; crack spreads.
Inventory behaviour tells is the system drawing down its buffer -- tank levels; floating storage; how fast cargoes are being turned around.
Bunkering behaviour tells is Singapore still serving the world, or turning inward -- bunker volumes; customer priorisation; pricing vs other ports.
Policy and procurement tells what authorities believe about duration risks -- emergency cargo purchases; diversification moves; subtle regulatory nudges.
Unlike other countries that rely on large strategic reserves, Singapore sits at the intersection of flows -- where crude arrives, is processed, priced and distributed across Asia. Traders and analysts track tanker movements, refinery utilisation, price behaviour, inventory turnover and bunkering activity. Together, these reveal whether oil is still flowing smoothly or beginning to strain. When flows are uninterrupted and arbitrage is functioning, Singapore behaves like a neutral conduit. When stress builds, its behaviour changes -- cargoes get rerouted, refiners adjust runs, and prices begin to reflect tighter prompt supply.
What makes Singapore especially important is the layer of commercial liquidity embedded in its system. Large volumes of crude and refined products are constantly in circulation. These are not strategic reserves but form a flexible buffer that can be redirected through price signals and trading activity. In the early stages of a disruption, this buffer absorbs shock and buys time, allowing supply chains to adjust without immediate breakdown.
What is Singapore's signal so far? It points to precaution rather than panic. There is no clear evidence of systemic stress -- no large-scale inventory drawdowns, no sustained scramble for prompt cargoes, no visible prioritisation away from global market functions.
The Actual Hormuz Threat To Singapore
On a daily basis 20 million bpd pass through the Hormuz Strait (15 mbpd is crude; 5 mbpd is petroleum products) That represents 25% of global seaborne oil trade, and 34$ of global crude trade>
But let's push a little:
- Saudi Arabia has a pipeline bypass from their Eastern oil fields to Yanbu, their Western port at the Red Sea. The capacity is 7 mbpd. Let's use a realistic figure of 5 mbpd.
- UAE has a pipeline bypass from Habshan to the Omani port of Fujairah. Capacity is 1.5 to 1.8 mbpd.
- Iran's oil exports (which is undersanction but gets to China) is about 1.5-2.0 mbpd.
Taking these into consideration, the Hormuz choke puts at risk about 14-16 mbpd. That's the real shortfall to think about. The bulk of these go to China (4 mbpd), India (3 mbpd), Japan (2 mbpd), South Korea (2 mbpd). What is Singapore's exposure -- 0.7 to 1.0 mbpd. I don't think any of those internet noises of disgruntled Singaporeans are even aware of this!
India is most vulnerable, Japan & Korea are structurally exposed, China is most resilient.
Singapore's direct physical exposure to Hormuz closure is material but not existential for domestic needs, because it can be partly substituted through alternative imports, inventories and market reallocation.
However, Singapore's broader exposure is significantly larger because it operates as a regional refining and trading hub, making it highly sensitive to disruptions in overall oil flows even when alternative supply can be found. It has to look after the oil liquidity for the Asian market.
Singapore behaves differently from other large importers. For example, India, Japan and Korea worry about volume loss. Singapore worries about flow disruption.
One needs to have a sense of all these multi-layered defences and reserves, and Singapore's role in the oil market, before judging whether Singapore should go kow-tow to the Ayatollah, who by the way, is now Ayatolleow.
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