AIR INDIA LOSSES - FROM GENERIC CRITIQUE TO PRECISE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (PART 1/4)
Public anger and parliamentary debate focused heavily on the cash drain on SIA. The local debate in Singapore frames Air India’s problems through the lens of poor passenger yields or localized operational inefficiency. The structural and operational roots behind Air India's cash burn are far more complex. Singaporeans walked away feeling Air India is inutile and SIA is a lame duck. Without understanding what actually caused the losses in Air India, no one is asking what remedial actions are being taken and can they be overcome? And therefore, providing an entirely different lens on SIA's investment in Air India.
There are 3 core loss-drivers for y/e 31 Mar 2026:
- A Severe Contraction in Top-Line Revenue
- Catastrophic Foreign Exchange (FX) Losses
- Fleet Maintenance and Supply Chain Stagnation
For each of these drivers, there are root causes. The distinction lies between the immediate cause on the financial ledger and the root cause of the operational paralysis. In the discussions in Singapore, no one has probed deep to understand the root causes and tell us if there is light at the end of the tunnel. It is worthwhile to rephrase what is mean here. These 3 core drivers explain the impact on the financial statements. The various reasons provided by media and others such as Vinai Rai's ISAS post, explains the causation for the 3 drivers. But none has explained how these factors drove the operational decisions that led to that financial disaster and what can be done about it. This void of structural analysis is what this article seeks to cover.
Part 1 of 4 covers the first core loss-driver - A Severe Contraction in Top-Line Revenue
The heart of the problem - crack spread:
The Corporate Finance Paradox: Why Air India Had to Cut RoutesSales revenue in 2026 down from ₹64,343.09 crore to ₹53,662.15 core
The heart of the problem - crack spread:
I think the extent of the fuel price shock on airlines is still not generally understood by those outside the industry. Gasoline, Diesel and Kerosene (Jet Fuel is a special form of kerosene) are distillates derived from crude oil by a refinery process called cracking. The difference between price of crude and these distillates is called the cracking spread. Historically, the jet fuel crack spread has been about US$15-US$22 per barrel.
The price of crude oil spiked due to the Hormuz closure. It peaked on 7 April 2026 at $138.21 bbl for Brent crude and $114.58 bbl for WTI crude. Based on historical crack spread, jet fuel price should have peaked at US$160 bbl (US$138 + US$22) but it peaked on 3 April at US$209 bbl. This means airlines suffered a double whammy of rising crude prices and an exploding jet fuel crack spread. Currently crude oil is US$100-US$110 bbl and jet fuel is about US$192 per barrel. The jet fuel crack spread is about US$80-US$90!
The world's major oil refineries are in the ME (UAE + Kuwait + Saudi Arabia), Asia Pacific (Singapore + South Korea + China) and India. UAE + Kuwait supply of jet fuel was cut-off by Hormuz closure. Singapore and Sorkor refineries had their crude feed stock reduced. China enforced a ban on export of jet fuel, reserving for their own use. That is causing jet fuel crack spread to sky rocket.
- Option A : Keep flying → means burn US$200 bbl spot fuel → revenue falls below variable costs → direct cash dissipation.
- Option B : Cut capacity → means ground the aircraft frames → stop variable cash bleed → Revenue shrinks.
Hedging carries a cost, and it is also a double-edged sword. Fuel cost goes up, those that did not hedge suffers. Fuel cost goes down, those that hedged suffers hedging losses. Some airlines are more risk averse as they feel the cost of hedging is too high. There have been experiences of airlines suffering high hedging losses when oil prices drops and so there exist a management philosophy of living with the risk that views the cost of hedging is not worth it. This is especially in China and the US.
Examples where not hedging fuel has been a primary reason for failures - ATA Airlines (2008), Delta Airlines (2005).
When Air India sells international tickets (overseas sales), these transactions are legally classified as an "export of services" and carry a 0% output tax rate. Because there is zero output sales tax collected on international routes, Air India has no tax liability against which it can offset the massive input taxes paid on domestic fuel purchases.
The airline cannot claim Input Tax Credit (ITC), transforming a variable operating tax directly into a permanent, unrecoverable drain on bottom-line equity. Skyrocketing fuel costs just added this unclaimed tax cost.
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The price of crude oil spiked due to the Hormuz closure. It peaked on 7 April 2026 at $138.21 bbl for Brent crude and $114.58 bbl for WTI crude. Based on historical crack spread, jet fuel price should have peaked at US$160 bbl (US$138 + US$22) but it peaked on 3 April at US$209 bbl. This means airlines suffered a double whammy of rising crude prices and an exploding jet fuel crack spread. Currently crude oil is US$100-US$110 bbl and jet fuel is about US$192 per barrel. The jet fuel crack spread is about US$80-US$90!
The world's major oil refineries are in the ME (UAE + Kuwait + Saudi Arabia), Asia Pacific (Singapore + South Korea + China) and India. UAE + Kuwait supply of jet fuel was cut-off by Hormuz closure. Singapore and Sorkor refineries had their crude feed stock reduced. China enforced a ban on export of jet fuel, reserving for their own use. That is causing jet fuel crack spread to sky rocket.
India comes in for special mention. It is a massive refining powerhouse, home to the single largest oil refining complex on the planet, producing 5.8 mn bpd. The Players are Reliance Industries (operating the twin Jamnagar Refineries at a staggering 1.4 million bpd capacity), alongside state-backed refiners like Indian Oil Corporation (IOCL) and BPCL. Reliance is currently acting as the critical "swing supplier" for the region. Because they can source alternative crude from non-Gulf regions (like Russia or Latin America), their Jamnagar desk is running at maximum capacity. Ships loaded with Reliance jet fuel and diesel have actively turned away from Europe and pivoted to Asia, cashing in on the record-breaking US$80+ per barrel crack spread margins in East-of-Suez markets.
The Breakeven Threshold Failure:
A quickie on marginal cost accounting helps to explain the situation. All production cost are classified into variable and fixed cost. Variable cost are what goes into producing the widget (accountants use this for whatever is the product) such as materials, labour, electricity, etc. Even if a widget is sold at a loss, as long as sale price is above variable cost, each sales still produces a marginal contribution, that is, a cashflow that helps to cover fixed costs. In the short term, the factory can still survive. The variable cost is the breakeven point. Selling below this point is simply pouring cash into a widget that is generating no contribution to cover fixed cost.
In aviation economics, an airline will continue to fly a route in the short term as long as the ticket revenue covers the variable costs (fuel, landing fees, catering), even if it fails to cover fixed costs (lease rentals, corporate debt, admin). When unhedged jet fuel surged past US$170–$200 bbl, the variable cost of flying a wide-body aircraft to London or New York exceeded the maximum revenue the plane could generate from ticket sales. To continue flying meant actively destroying cash with every mile.
With crude oil at its April peak and had crack spread remain at historical levels, the jet fuel of US$160 bbl, airlines could still fly within breakeven thresholds. The explosion of crack spread has caused jet fuel cost to bring airlines past break even point of US$170–$200 bbl for those who have not hedged.
The Unhedged strategic trap:
In aviation economics, an airline will continue to fly a route in the short term as long as the ticket revenue covers the variable costs (fuel, landing fees, catering), even if it fails to cover fixed costs (lease rentals, corporate debt, admin). When unhedged jet fuel surged past US$170–$200 bbl, the variable cost of flying a wide-body aircraft to London or New York exceeded the maximum revenue the plane could generate from ticket sales. To continue flying meant actively destroying cash with every mile.
With crude oil at its April peak and had crack spread remain at historical levels, the jet fuel of US$160 bbl, airlines could still fly within breakeven thresholds. The explosion of crack spread has caused jet fuel cost to bring airlines past break even point of US$170–$200 bbl for those who have not hedged.
The Unhedged strategic trap:
For an airline, when fuel prices spike violently, management is trapped in a classic optimization dilemma. Without a financial hedge, they are forced to make a brutal binary choice:
- Option A : Keep flying → means burn US$200 bbl spot fuel → revenue falls below variable costs → direct cash dissipation.
- Option B : Cut capacity → means ground the aircraft frames → stop variable cash bleed → Revenue shrinks.
Because Air India had no derivative buffer to subsidise the spot market price, the inability to hedge legally and financially stripped them of their operational flexibility. They could not afford to choose Option A (flying at a direct variable loss). Therefore, the lack of hedging forced them into Option B -- pull back capacity, slash international frequencies by 27%, and domestic flight schedules by up to 22%. The result -- revenue contraction.
High Fuel Cost Is Not The Problem. Not Hedging It IsFuel is one of the highest cost factor in aviation business. When fuel cost rises airlines max out their capability to pass on to customers via fuel surcharges. Competition and regulation is the restraint. Airlines have lived with unpredictable fuel prices for decades and the risk is managed by hedging strategies. Some airlines hedge fuel, while others deliberately leave themselves exposed to market prices. Hedging policy depends on the airline's financial strength, access to derivatives, ability to pass costs to passengers, regulatory environment and tolerance for earnings volatility.
Hedging carries a cost, and it is also a double-edged sword. Fuel cost goes up, those that did not hedge suffers. Fuel cost goes down, those that hedged suffers hedging losses. Some airlines are more risk averse as they feel the cost of hedging is too high. There have been experiences of airlines suffering high hedging losses when oil prices drops and so there exist a management philosophy of living with the risk that views the cost of hedging is not worth it. This is especially in China and the US.
Examples where not hedging fuel has been a primary reason for failures - ATA Airlines (2008), Delta Airlines (2005).
Malaysia's Air Asia current financial distress is due largely to running an unhedged operation..
Historically, Chinese state-backed carriers have avoided derivative-based hedging. While China Eastern held a very thin position, Air China and China Southern entered 2026 with zero hedging contracts. The resulting crude-to-jet fuel price gap has hammered their bottom lines, causing them to tumble heavily in stock valuation and project massive losses despite China’s domestic oil refining advantages. For Chinese airlines, avoiding derivative fuel hedging is heavily driven by a structural desire to eliminate US Dollar (USD) exposure and comply with strict national foreign exchange controls. While Western airlines treat fuel hedging strictly as a commodity risk management problem, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) must view it through the lens of geopolitics, currency risk, and historical regulatory trauma.
The biggest shockwave of the unhedged strategy is actually occurring in the United States, where major carriers spent the last decade completely dismantling their hedging programs adopting a policy the hedging costs do not justify the risks. As a result, US legacy carriers are facing a multi-billion dollar annualized fuel headwind, forcing capacity cuts across their long-haul international networks.
The aviation industry is currently facing a sharp divide -- well-hedged airlines (like Singapore Airlines, which booked a S$218 million hedging gain) are surviving, while unhedged structural giants like Air India, Air China, and the US majors are absorbing pure macroeconomic pain.
Air India Hit By Banking & Regulatory MechanismIndian refiners are Reliance (the largest) and several state-owned Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs). OMCs serve the domestic market. Reliance currently manages an enviable lucrative commodity arbitrage -- buying cheap crude and selling distillates in the international market chasing record crack spreads.
The Import Parity Pricing (IPP) Link:
When global supply is constrained, Reliance maximises profits by selling in the international markets. OMCs are required to sell Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) in domestic markets using the IPP formula. This means jet fuel is priced at international spot prices + freight, insurance, and import duties -- even though the fuel is refined locally in Gujarat or Maharashtra. IPP formula automatically benchmarks local fuel to these spiking international rates.
The Domestic Supply Arbitrage and Government Taxes
The Indian government intervenes with structural taxes to prevent private refiners from exporting all their fuel and starving the domestic economy,. They implemented a sharp ATF Export Tax (raising it to ₹14.50 per litre). Poor tax design created additional problems. Instead of penalising offshore arbitrage and keep fuel inside India, it caused a structural floor under the price. OMCs keep domestic pump rates highly elevated (peaking near ₹142 per litre on the spot market) to match the high returns private refiners can get via exports despite the duty.
The Rejection of the Price Stabilisation Fund
To shield carriers from the ME crisis, the government offered to fix domestic ATF at a uniform ₹115 per litre via interest-free advances to OMCs. For an international bank checking the credit risk, the catch was that the scheme required a 3-year locked contract. Because global prices briefly softened below that baseline, Air India and other carriers refused to sign up, fearing they would be locked into a high fixed cost while global players enjoyed cheaper fuel. Once the market spiked again, the stabilization safety net collapsed, leaving Air India fully exposed to the spot market.
The Structural Fuel Trap - Air India’s Unhedged Position Causes Maximum Financial BleedingAir India’s massive operational losses are structurally anchored by a dual financial friction point: an asymmetric tax trap on the domestic front and severe regulatory straightjackets on global derivative desks. Let's unpack.
The Asymmetric Sales Tax Trap (The Input-Output Mismatch)
In India, jet fuel sits completely outside the unified Goods and Services Tax (GST) framework. Instead, it is subject to a cascading mix of central excise duties and state-level Value Added Taxes (VAT) reaching up to 30%. This creates a massive, rigid input tax cost.
When Air India sells international tickets (overseas sales), these transactions are legally classified as an "export of services" and carry a 0% output tax rate. Because there is zero output sales tax collected on international routes, Air India has no tax liability against which it can offset the massive input taxes paid on domestic fuel purchases.
The airline cannot claim Input Tax Credit (ITC), transforming a variable operating tax directly into a permanent, unrecoverable drain on bottom-line equity. Skyrocketing fuel costs just added this unclaimed tax cost.
The Derivative Restriction (The Regulatory Currency Straightjacket)
We can now understand the feedback loop on the first of the 3 core drivers of losses. Air India Revenue dropped. Sales dropped because Air India cut routes. It cut routes because high fuel cost has hit breakeven threshold. (High fuel cost also increased unclaimed GST.) High fuel cost could not be mitigated because Air India did not hedge.
Note that the oft repeated Pakistan air-space closure forced Air India planes to take longer routes is not a real issue. Had breakeven threshold not breached, the longer routes can continue as it will still bring in positive cashflows.
So now the question of value the debates in Singapore have never asked is why did Air India not hedge fuel cost and what can it do going forward?
Here we enter high finance and very complicated stuff. I shall just explain the basics and in very layman terms. Let me preface it this way so you understand where I'm coming from. In India, because of strict capital controls, the bureaucracy treats macro risk management as a potential tax evasion or illegal capital flight scheme. This lies at the heart of why institutional commodities trading desks loathe dealing with onshore Indian corporate accounts.
The Bureaucratic Trap
Under strict Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) frameworks, domestic Indian corporates face intense compliance hurdles when executing cross-border derivatives. The treasury must meticulously match every paper hedge to a physical delivery contract to prove it isn't "speculative trading." Hedging to protect an underlying business from price volatility is allowed, but outright speculative trading, or gambling, is not allowed.
For each derivative trade, it must show all the paper proof of an underlying physical exposure, examples invoices, delivery notes or fuel pumped. In the case of futures, documentary paper work to support schedules, fuel consumption expectations etc. The Indian bureaucratic approving process makes it near impossible for a derivatives desk to function. In a standard, fluid global corporate treasury, hedging is dynamic. The trading desk cannot sit and wait for paper work approvals that takes days.
Hedging with derivatives is never in a one-to-one situation. You execute one trade and just wait it to expiry. It does not work like that. Derivatives market is very dynamic. Variables change by the minute. The derivatives desk manages what is called a rolling hedge. The portfolio is not a static collection of contracts. It is continually reshaped by successive trading decisions in response to fuel prices and airline's projected requirement changes. Long and short exposures could be changed, swaps could be used, volumes could change. The derivative contracts are malleable. In a rolling hedge, the audit trail to the paper evidence that supported the original contracts are no longer traceable over time.
To an Indian banking compliance auditor or a tax inspector checking the books months later, an unlinked derivative trade that results in a cash loss is immediately flagged as "unauthorized speculative trading" or a violation of FEMA. The administrative burden of constantly auditing, tracking, and justifying hundreds of fast-moving, rolling adjustments against a rigid, slow-moving physical delivery ledger makes a true rolling hedge operation functionally impossible to execute onshore.
Note that the oft repeated Pakistan air-space closure forced Air India planes to take longer routes is not a real issue. Had breakeven threshold not breached, the longer routes can continue as it will still bring in positive cashflows.
So now the question of value the debates in Singapore have never asked is why did Air India not hedge fuel cost and what can it do going forward?
Here we enter high finance and very complicated stuff. I shall just explain the basics and in very layman terms. Let me preface it this way so you understand where I'm coming from. In India, because of strict capital controls, the bureaucracy treats macro risk management as a potential tax evasion or illegal capital flight scheme. This lies at the heart of why institutional commodities trading desks loathe dealing with onshore Indian corporate accounts.
The Bureaucratic Trap
Under strict Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) frameworks, domestic Indian corporates face intense compliance hurdles when executing cross-border derivatives. The treasury must meticulously match every paper hedge to a physical delivery contract to prove it isn't "speculative trading." Hedging to protect an underlying business from price volatility is allowed, but outright speculative trading, or gambling, is not allowed.
For each derivative trade, it must show all the paper proof of an underlying physical exposure, examples invoices, delivery notes or fuel pumped. In the case of futures, documentary paper work to support schedules, fuel consumption expectations etc. The Indian bureaucratic approving process makes it near impossible for a derivatives desk to function. In a standard, fluid global corporate treasury, hedging is dynamic. The trading desk cannot sit and wait for paper work approvals that takes days.
Hedging with derivatives is never in a one-to-one situation. You execute one trade and just wait it to expiry. It does not work like that. Derivatives market is very dynamic. Variables change by the minute. The derivatives desk manages what is called a rolling hedge. The portfolio is not a static collection of contracts. It is continually reshaped by successive trading decisions in response to fuel prices and airline's projected requirement changes. Long and short exposures could be changed, swaps could be used, volumes could change. The derivative contracts are malleable. In a rolling hedge, the audit trail to the paper evidence that supported the original contracts are no longer traceable over time.
To an Indian banking compliance auditor or a tax inspector checking the books months later, an unlinked derivative trade that results in a cash loss is immediately flagged as "unauthorized speculative trading" or a violation of FEMA. The administrative burden of constantly auditing, tracking, and justifying hundreds of fast-moving, rolling adjustments against a rigid, slow-moving physical delivery ledger makes a true rolling hedge operation functionally impossible to execute onshore.
The Double Currency Multiplier:
When you add the currency layer, the complexity does not just add up -- it multiplies exponentially. Because the underlying commodity (e.g. Singapore Jet Fuel swaps) settles in USD, but Air India’s domestic revenues arrive in INR, the treasury desk is forced to run a "Cross-Currency Commodity Hedge". It means Air India must hedge both the price of the oil and the value of the Rupee simultaneously.
Doing this onshore hits two massive, hard banking regulation hurdles:
Doing this onshore hits two massive, hard banking regulation hurdles:
Hurdle A: RBI’s Ban on Onshore "Structured Cross-Asset Derivatives"
Following historical derivative scandals where Indian corporates lost billions on complex, multi-currency options structures, the RBI implemented a strict product boundary rule: Indian banks are heavily restricted from selling or clearing "structured derivatives" to domestic corporations.
An Indian corporate treasury cannot cleanly package a commodity hedge and a currency hedge into a single, optimized cross-asset derivative product with a domestic bank. Instead, they are legally forced to break the strategy apart into two completely separate silos: a standard commodity hedge and a standard currency forward contract. Running these two tracks independently requires twice the collateral, drastically inflates transaction costs, and creates severe execution lag.
Hurdle B: Netting Restrictions and the "Capital Outflow" Blockade
In global banking hubs like Singapore or London, a trading desk operates on a Portfolio Netting framework. If you lose $10 million on a currency forward but make $12 million on a fuel swap with the same banking counterparty, the bank simply nets the position and you settle the $2 million difference.
Onshore Indian banking regulations severely restrict cross-product netting for corporate clients.
If Air India’s onshore treasury loses money on a USD fuel swap executed with an international bank’s branch, remitting that hard USD out of India to settle the loss triggers aggressive capital-outflow scrutiny. The domestic clearing bank cannot easily net that loss against an independent onshore INR currency gain, locking up massive amounts of corporate liquidity in separate margin pools.
The Final Analytical Reality Of Hedging For Air India
This operational straightjacket explains why all international Indian airlines have no means of managing their fuel risks by hedging and thus ended up hemorrhaging in the current fuel price shock. There is nothing much that can be done onshore. Are there any workaround ways? Corporations often devise some offshore mechanism to manage these type of complexities. For example, Air India can set up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) domiciled in Singapore and allow SIA's risk management team to run it. You can bet they have teams of lawyers, accountants and tax specialists studying this. But this kind of arrangement brings with it tremendous amount of tax and regulatory impediments and cracking (mind the pun) India's great wall of bureaucracy is a challenge. The legal reality is a Singapore SPV managed by SIA’s treasury would trigger immediate Indian "Place of Effective Management" (PoEM) tax regulations, risking having the entire offshore vehicle taxed as an onshore Indian entity.
Even before the Air India-Vistra merger was completed, Air India had incorporated a wholly-owned subsidiary GIFT City entity - AI Fleet Services IFSC Ltd in 2023. This unit takes care of aircraft leasing and financing.,
There is no known report that Tata-SIA is actively exploring the IFSC sandbox to set up a treasury operation there to manage fuel-priced and foreign-exchange risks. The strategic idea is worth investigating, and it wouldn't surprise anyone if Tata-SIA are actively looking to use GIFT to build an internationally connected fuel-risk-management operation for Air India, rather than treating every hedge as an ordinary onshore Indian airline transaction. The hurdle remains the Indian central banks tight capital controls distinguishing between domestic and foreign transactions.
GIFT City has great promises, but the rear view mirror flashes a warning of a "Foreign Exchange Illusion": While GIFT City operates as a domestic offshore zone primarily in USD, an onshore Indian entity transferring capital into a GIFT City treasury structure to execute cross-border derivatives is still tightly bound by RBI's strict retail/corporate outward remittance quotas and underlying trade documentation checks, the same bureaucratic trap outside of GIFT City. But GIFT City was designed specifically to help solve exactly the kind of problem Air India is facing with rolling hedge strategy, it seems this is an obvious path Tata-SIA must follow to develop an operational solution.
Part 2 of 4 will cover the second core loss-driver - Catastrophic Foreign Exchange (FX) Losses
India's GIFT City (Gujarat International Tec-City)
GIFT City was conceived as India's answer to Singapore, Dubai and other international financial centres -- a way to conduct international financial business under a more globally competitive regulatory and tax framework, without moving the activity offshore.
GIFT City was conceived in 2007 but it was only between 2015 and 2020 that the IFSC (International Financial Services Centre) exchanges began operations. In 2020 the IFSCA International Financial Services Centre Authority) was established as a united regulator. Since then, the aviation-finance ecosystem has gained practical momentum. By 2022 India's overseas commodity-hedging was in place, but access remained subject to RBI rules, eligibility, exposure and documentation requirements.
GIFT City was conceived in 2007 but it was only between 2015 and 2020 that the IFSC (International Financial Services Centre) exchanges began operations. In 2020 the IFSCA International Financial Services Centre Authority) was established as a united regulator. Since then, the aviation-finance ecosystem has gained practical momentum. By 2022 India's overseas commodity-hedging was in place, but access remained subject to RBI rules, eligibility, exposure and documentation requirements.
Even before the Air India-Vistra merger was completed, Air India had incorporated a wholly-owned subsidiary GIFT City entity - AI Fleet Services IFSC Ltd in 2023. This unit takes care of aircraft leasing and financing.,
There is no known report that Tata-SIA is actively exploring the IFSC sandbox to set up a treasury operation there to manage fuel-priced and foreign-exchange risks. The strategic idea is worth investigating, and it wouldn't surprise anyone if Tata-SIA are actively looking to use GIFT to build an internationally connected fuel-risk-management operation for Air India, rather than treating every hedge as an ordinary onshore Indian airline transaction. The hurdle remains the Indian central banks tight capital controls distinguishing between domestic and foreign transactions.
GIFT City has great promises, but the rear view mirror flashes a warning of a "Foreign Exchange Illusion": While GIFT City operates as a domestic offshore zone primarily in USD, an onshore Indian entity transferring capital into a GIFT City treasury structure to execute cross-border derivatives is still tightly bound by RBI's strict retail/corporate outward remittance quotas and underlying trade documentation checks, the same bureaucratic trap outside of GIFT City. But GIFT City was designed specifically to help solve exactly the kind of problem Air India is facing with rolling hedge strategy, it seems this is an obvious path Tata-SIA must follow to develop an operational solution.
Part 2 of 4 will cover the second core loss-driver - Catastrophic Foreign Exchange (FX) Losses
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