BURIED HYPE: WHY THE KRA LANDBRIDGE WON'T SINK SINGAPORE PORT
THE THAIS TAKE THE PLUNGE INTO AN OLD IDEA
Thai Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) announced on 22 Aug 2025 their approval for the landbridge on the Kra Isthmus that will connect the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand. This calls for the development of two deep sea ports, Ranong on the West and Chumphon on the East, and for the ports to be connected by a 90 km highway and rail link. They will start calling for tenders in 2026.
It is envisaged that East-West bound vessels will use this link instead of passing the Straits of Malacca thus bypassing the port of Singapore.
The idea of shortening the sea route with a canal across the Kra Isthmus isn't new. Ancient traders and explorers in the 17th-18th century had noted the strategic value of the shortcut. In the 1830s the British considered a canal and did some surveys. In the 1950s-1970s Thai/US/Japanese made some studies and proposals. In 2000s PM Thaksin Sinawatra revived the idea of the canal as part of a broader economic plan for the south, and in 2020s PM Srettha Thavisin revitalised the idea but as a landbridge, and PM Paetongtarn Sinawatra approved it.
For China, a shortcut through the Kra Isthmus is largely a commercial interest rather than a core strategic or geopolitical project like many Belt and Road corridors. It does not offer China military access or control over a chokepoint. As it lacks strategic geopolitical imperatives, the project is not explicitly integrated into China's Maritime Silk Road.
With Thailand going alone, it retains control and sovereignty but is unable to undertake a canal project thus the alternative landbridge. Chinese interest is welcome for capital and engineering.
SINGAPORE'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE MOVE THAT BROUGHT DOWN A GOVERNMENT
All knee jerk reactions see this project as a threat to Singapore's position as a major trading hub, it's reason d'etre in ancient times and continued major economic importance in current times. 'Panican' Singaporeans may ask why hasn't the government done anything to mitigate the threat. As a matter of fact, back in the 2000s there was speculation the government did try to do something involving some creative accounting of US$500m to make the problem go away. Let me explain.
On assuming office as Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra had to divest his 49.6% shareholdings in his telcom Shin Corp. He transferred the shares to his family members. As the sale was done through the Stock Exchange of Thailand and transacted between individuals, there was no capital gains tax. By 2002, Thaksin started actively to revive the canal idea as part of policy for economic development of the South. Some time later, Temasek went into negotiations to acquire Thaksin family's stake of 49.6% in Shin Corp. The deal was sealed in 2006 three days after the government relaxed the restriction of foreign ownership in telcom corporations. The transaction was convoluted and involved nominees and payments to offshore accounts. (I blogged on his transaction in 2021 here).
Temasek acquired 1,489,740,120 Shin Corp shares at Thb49.25 = Thb74.4b (US$1.88b). The market price was about Thb50-55 at the time. As the issue price was Thb10, Thaksin's gains were Thb73,369,700,910 (US$1.85b). Since the transaction was not done in SET and not between individuals, there was a tax liability @ 30% = Thb22b (US$556m). The use of nominees and offshore accounts appeared to be an attempt to evade tax.
Charges of corruption ensued which eventually led to Thaksin's ouster. In 2010 the Thai government seized Thaksin's assets of US$2.4b but eventually returned US900m. The US$500m confiscated by the government obviously is for tax recovery. The episode called into question ethical investment practice of Temasek. Many at the time were persuaded by conspiracy theory it was a strategic move by Singapore to get Thaksin to drop the Kra Canal idea.
I recall thinking at the time that if indeed Temasek's acquisition was not purely commercially motivated, and that it caused the downfall of a government, it was perhaps a miscalculation. How much of Singapore's Think Tank input contributed to that decision, I wonder. I was convinced then, and now too, that a Kra Canal will never materialise. It is not a matter of cost-benefit decision, but a matter of national security. Thailand has faced longstanding separatist and insurgent movements in the Southern provinces which are predominantly Malay Muslims. A Buddhist Thailand will never physically separate the Muslim-dominated Southern region with a canal.
A CAVAET FOR THE THAIS
So now, no canal, but a landbridge. Details are not available, but the US-based Pulitzer Centre for Crisis Reporting estimates the cost between US$28b to US$36b. However it is, we should wish our neighbour well in their endeavours. I do worry for the Thais.
The Iron Law of Megaprojects predicts such projects always end up with overruns in cost and time, all the time.History is littered with proofs of this iron law. (Statistics from Hlybjerg 2014). Cost can exceed by 50-100% depending on size and complexity of the project. In a worse case scenario, the cost could balloon to US$72b. The national debt at 2024 of US$335b could increase to between US$364b - US$407 which will exceed Thai legal limit of 70% for debt to GDP ratio.
Thai OTP number crunchers say container shipping will be reduced by 4 days and costs cut by 15%, and there is high potential for long-term economic growth as the project has a high Economic Internal Rate of Return of 17.38% pa. There is always an optimism bias on the part of project promoters.
WHAT IS ACTUALLY THE PURE SAILING TIME SAVED
First and foremost, talk of savings of 4 days shipping time is a fallacy. The project is a landbridge, not a canal. Vessels stop at one port and cargo is moved by land to another vessel on the other port. Cost comparison to 4 days shipping cost is completely incorrect. There has been a structural change to the shipping model. Instead of a single vessel, it now requires 2 vessels. Tonnage has doubled, and what this means for the shipping industry as a whole is a big question mark. I will return to this later.
The distance shortened is between 1,000-1,200km. The question then is, supposing vessels do not stop at Singapore, how long will it take to cover this distance. The answer of course, depends on the type of vessel and its speed. Journal of Shipping and Trade and World Ports Organisation estimated it will take between 2-5 days. Thais say about 4 days.
Transit time is distance/speed. Vessel speed is in knots (1 knot = 1.852 km/h)
Panamax vessels (speed is 15-18 knots):
- If 1,000 km -- at 15 knots takes 35 hrs (1.5 day)
-- at 18 knots takes 30 hrs (1.25 day)
- If 1,200 km -- at 15 knots takes 43 hrs (1.8 day)
-- at 18 knots takes 36 hrs (1.5 day)
Post-Panamax vessels (speed 18-22 knots):
- If 1,000 km -- at 18 knots takes 30 hrs (1.25 day)
-- at 22 knots takes 24.6 hrs (1 day)
- If 1,200 km -- at 18 knots takes 36 hrs (1.5 day)
-- at 22 knots takes 29.5 hrs (1.25 day)
VLCV - very large container vessels (speed is 20-25 knots)
- If 1,000 km -- at 20 knots takes 27 hrs (1.13 day)
-- at 22 knots takes 21.6 hrs (0.9 day)
- If 1,200 km -- at 20 knots takes 32.4 hrs (1.35 day)
-- at 22 knots takes 25.9 hrs (1.08 day)
On paper pure sailing time saved is less than 2 days.
THE CORRECT BASIS TO COMPARE TIME SAVED
The Kra Landbridge is not plain sailing. It introduces additional friction. It requires unloading at one port-to-yard, loading up to trucks or trains, transit 90 km overland, unloading from trucks and trains to yard at the other port, finally loading up the vessels on the other side. All these, and much more which I will detail, eats into the time saved by the short-cut.
The devil is in the details. The Port Operations Manager of a shipping company I am not, so I can only explain superficially how the time will stretch. Thai OTP says the ports will be fully-automated so I shall restrict my comments to this mode, which is also assuming truck and train loading/unloading are all automated. Conventional non-automated ports will not work for the Thais because unloading and loading times will take double the days.
Another critical point to note is what sort of model is the Kra Landbridge. Is it a straight-through relay model or more realistically a trans-shipment hub model?
A straight-through relay is a direct cross-dock mode, which means containers are not temporarily placed in yards and 100% of the containers are transferred. Vessel berths, containers move to trucks or rails, transit the 90 km land route, and directly load up into waiting vessel. This is elegant but requires no imbalance of import/export flows, no mixed flows (different destinations, feeder vs motherships.) It requires perfect timing. The slightest delays at any point causes bottlenecks. Bypassing buffering in yard saves substantial time on the whole process. However, this can apply only to the long-haul shipment which is a very limited market.
Over 90-95% of the traffic is that of trans-shipment containers which spend time in the yard. This is due to vessel scheduling not in perfect relay sequence, mix of destinations of the TEUs, customs/security hold-ups, crane movement timing, vessel stowage, etc. The whole port operation is a complex choreography of moving TEUs to prevent congestion at any point. The yard acts like a buffer reservoir absorbing fast inflow from land operations and metering out a slower controlled outflow to quay cranes. It's function is to decouple bursty land-side from the slower, highly sequenced sea-side operations.
In port operation there is something called 'dwelling time'. This is time wasted as one operation waits for another due to imperfect synchronisation. For example the crane movements, labour shift-changes, waiting for stowage tugs and pilot, paper-work jams, custom inspections, etc.
Stowage is the toughest part. Every vessel has a stowage plan and a computerised management app controlled by a human specialist. Look at the stowage plan as a 3-D grid slot of bays, rows and tiers. The plan determines which container goes into which slot. The plan manages ship stability (distributes the weight of the cargo); port rotation (containers for next port is placed on top for easier accessibility; and dangerous cargo rules (eg explosive material away from engine rooms); and efficiency (minimise unnecessary re-handling to 're-stow' at each port. This means TEUs are managed in the yards in specific arrangements to facilitate onboarding. All this eats up time.
At Singapore, it is one-stop trans-shipment. At Kra Landbridge, it is two port trans-shipment, which means double the time spent with on vessel loading and unloading. A fully automated port can clear a container vessel within 1-2 days, depending on vessel size and TEUs. For Kra Landbridge, this timing is doubled due to dual port operations.
90-95% of the vessels trans-ship at Singapore. So we should compare on the basis of trans-shipment port. We assume the Thai ports function at the same efficiency level as Singapore in terms of unloading vessel-to-yard, and loading yard-to-vessel. However, the Kra Landbridge involves 100% unloading and 100% loading. Vessels trans-ship at Singapore offload only some containers to feeder vessels and take on some new containers. Comparison of time spent loading and unloading by both Singapore and Kra Landbridge is impossible without data and some algorithm. Obviously we can assume it takes more time at the Kra Landbridge because it involves 100% container transfers.
For our purpose here, we can leave the dock-side operations out. Just the additional time required for land-side operation, ie yard-to-trucks/trains loading, road /rail transit and trucks/train-to-yard unloading alone will show the Kra Landbridge has no selling point on time saved.
SUMMARY OF TIME REQUIRED FOR LAND-SIDE OPERATIONS
Using trucks :
Yard-to-truck loading - 55.9 hrs
Road Transit - 46 hrs
Truck-to-yard-unloading - 16.75 hrs
TOTAL TIME: 118.65 hrs (4.9 days)
Using standard gauge trains:
Yard-to-train loading - 9 hrs
Rail transit - 7.25 hrs hrs
Train-yard-unloading - 9 hrs
TOTAL TIME: 25.25 hrs (1 day)
Using metre gauge trains:
Yard-to-train loading - 23.75 hrs
Rail transit - 13.5 hrs hrs
Train-yard-unloading - 23.75 hrs
TOTAL TIME: 61 hrs (2.5 days)< br />
The summary here is for those not interested in the computational details. Detailed computation and explanation, which are quite informative, are shown at the end of the article.
Time required on the landbridge operations above is based on vessel with 4,000 TEUs and average processing times recorded in other ports.
There are 3 basic sizes of container vessels with capacity measured by TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit).
* Panamax: 4,000 - 5,000 TEU.
* Post-Panamax: 5,000-14,000 TEU
* VLCU (very large container vessel): 14,000-24,000 TEU.
Obviously the land-side time required is much more for the bigger vessels. I have done the same computation for bigger vessels but only showing the summaries here just to present the big picture. Detailed computation is not shown.
For 14,000 TEUs:
Using trucks :
Yard-to-truck loading - 194.6 hrs
Road Transit - 157 hrs
Truck-to-yard-unloading - 58.4 hrs
TOTAL TIME: 410 hrs (17 days)
Using standard gauge trains:
Yard-to-train loading - 30 hrs
Rail transit - 23.9 hrs hrs
Train-yard-unloading - 30 hrs
TOTAL TIME: 25.25 hrs (3.5 days)
Using metre gauge trains:
Yard-to-train loading - 80 hrs
Rail transit - 43.8 hrs
Train-yard-unloading - 80 hrs
TOTAL TIME: 203.8 hrs (8.5 days)
The above is in respect of bigger vessels with 14,000 TEUx. What more the VLCV of 24,000 TEUs!.
It is clear on the basis of time saved, the additional land-side operations make the Kra Landbridge a non-viable model to short cut the round trip through Singapore port.
COST COMPARISON
At the micro per vessel level, the comparison is the opportunity cost of the 1,000-1,200 km saved (mainly bunker fuel and Singapore port charges) vs Kra Landbridge charges. Bunker fuel can be from US$100,000 to US200,000+ per day sailing depending on vessel size and price of bunker fuel. Port charges are complex depending on services used, vessel size, cargoes moved, and time spent. Kra port charges would most likely be lower than Singapore's, but bearing in mind there will be two Thai port charges. It is doubtful the price of 2 can be cheaper than 1. Added to this, there will be a charge for the land transit. What that rate will be is unknown at this stage, but the Thais will have a high capex to recover.
At the macro operational level, the Kra Landbridge has absolutely no selling point to freight companies for some fatal issues:
* It now needs to maintain 3 hubs, one in Singapore and two in Thailand. Carriers save costs by clustering services at one hub. Splitting into 3 weaker hubs strips away economies of scale.
* Two ships are now required for the same cargo. Service string now needs two vessels instead of one. The global fleet is currently tight, doubling vessel requirements increases chartering or ownership costs massively. Unless shipping lines cut number of services, fleet utilisation drops.
* Dual ports mean additional handling and stowage which means increased risk of misconnection or cargo misrouting.
* Additional handling and stowage worsens shedule reliability which is fatal for time-sensitive cargo.
In summary, carriers are looking at:
(1) Double port costs.
(2) Higher capital costs per TEU moved.
(3) Trans-shipment inefficiency with higher logistics risk and insurance exposure.
(4) Lower network efficiency compared to the competitiveness by staying in Singapore.
Thailand needs to subsidise massively port charges and land transfer fees to make up to carriers facing higher operating costs, lower schedule reliability, weaker economies of scale.
OTHER FACTORS
Tankers (including VLCCs):
The Kra Isthmus Landbridge is not for these carriers. Tankers need pipelines for the land-side operation and a lot of other infrastructure which is not in the plan. About 200 tankers ply the Straits of Malacca daily. Only about 20% call at Singapore. The huge VLCCs are mostly long haul vessels for East Asia. Their load is too large for Singapore refineries. Singapore is a big refinery player and many smaller tankers unload here. Some VLCCs unload part of their load for Singapore by transferring to smaller vessels in places such as Malacca and these smaller tankers then call at Jurong port.
Container vessel traffic:
Daily traffic on the Straits of Malacca is about 100-150 daily. About 80% call at Singapore. It does not seem possible the land-side operations of the Kra Landbridge can support even just 10% of the traffic.
Other Port services:
Many vessels call at Singapore for other port services such as minor repairs and bunker oil. Singapore is an established ship repair and services player and cheaper bunker oil. If the vessels are not unloading, they remain in the Outer Anchorage thus avoiding port fees.
Bunker fuel management:
Bunker fuel is the highest cost component for vessels. There are a few types. HFO (Higher Fuel Oil) is the traditional fuel with high sulfur content and other impurities, modern fuels with less than 0.5% sulphur, VLSFO (very low sulphur oil), MGO (marine gas oil). (Some may run on LNG, methanol or biofuels).
Ships don't usually carry fuel to the brim and there are reasons:
- Fuel is heavy. Extra weight causes drag. So it is weight vs efficiency. So they often carry enough fuel to reach the next low-cost refueling hub.
- Over bunkering locks up capital in fuel, which is inefficient.
- Another reason is operationanal flexibility. Vessels rarely know their return or onward charters in advance. Keeping tanks less full allows flexibility to switch fuels.
- Too much fuel reduces freeboard (the distance between waterline and deck) which can affect seaworthiness.
- Ports impose draft restrictions, ie max depth allowed, so fuel loading has to be balanced with cargo load.
- Vessels switch fuels to balance compliance, cost and performance:
* different maritime regulations require sulphur content compliance.
* of cost minimisation efforts. A ship may run on cheaper HSFO fuel on the high seas, then switch to low-sulphur MGO or VLSFO before entering ECAs (Emission Control Areas)
* operational performance -- when operating at low loads, heavy fuels don't burn efficiently at low termperatures.
That is why Singapore thrives. Local oil refinery gives Singapore a cost advantage on bunker fuel. Vessels can safely tank up at Singapore without carrying excessive fuel across oceans. Cheaper bunker oil availability gives Singapore a tremendous boost to its competitiveness as a trans-shipment hub.
BOTTOM-LINE OPINION: KRA LANDBRIDGE IS A BOBO
The Thai OTP announced the ministry's approval of the Kra Isthmus Landbridge project on Aug 22 but it needed cabinet to greenlight it. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was removed as Prime Minister by the Constitutional Court on August 29. It is believed cabinet approved the project in the week Paetongtarn was removed.
Although it was her predecessor Srettha Thavisin who aggressively revitalised the Kra shortcut idea, it was nevertheless Paetongtarn's administration that approved it. The Kra shortcut idea seems like a curse for the Shinawatra family. Just like her, her father Thaksin, was ousted as Prime Minister during the height of publicity for the project in the 2000's.
Let's hope there is no repeat of a Temasek style attempt to scuttle another Kra shortcut project. Think-Tanks predominantly look at geopolitical spheres and its politico-economic impact and advises the government accordingly. As I mentioned, a Kra Canal there never will be, for national security reasons. And the math I present here, a Kra Landbridge will be a bobo. I have no idea what Singapore Think-Tanks fed to the government that germinated the Temasek buyout of Thaksin's Shin Corp decades ago, and what they advise now. There was a commentary in January 2024 by Ian Storey, a senior fellow of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, one of Singapore's Think-Tanks. You can read it here. Unfortunately it is the usual bla-bla with no specifics and one is none the wiser whether the Kra Landbridge will sink Singapore port.
For far too long both the Kra Canal and Landbridge has been over-hyped as a threat to Singapore's position as a trans-shipment hub. With my explainer here, you can take the math to the bank. Singaporeans can sleep soundly. Never fear. Just keep improving our entreport and auxillary services, more state-of-the-art efficiency, more business-friendly and most important of all, more cost-effective.
The illustration is based on the example of a smaller vessel with 4,000 TEU.
(A) HAULING CONTAINERS FROM THE YARD OF RECEIVING PORT
Using Trucks:
Loading time per truck per TEU is 15-30 mins.
Total time required to load an entire vessel's cargo depends on the number of loading bays. The larger ports have about 20-40 loading bays per terminal. Let's assume Kra Landmine has 30.
Transit time is 1.5 hours to 2.25 hours depending on weather and road conditions. The road system is 6 lanes, 3 lanes Eastbound, 3 lanes Westbound.
Calculating total loading time:
Loading per truck per TEU - average 25 minutes.
Total trucks - 4,000
Loading bays - 30 (parallel, automated).
20 bays handle 133 trucks and 10 bays handle 134 trucks each.
The biggest number of trucks is the bottleneck.
Throughput = 30 trucks per 25 mins = 72 trucks per hour.
Total loading time = 134 x 25 mins = 55.9 hrs
Note: The more loading bays, the lower the total loading time. The constraint is the exit gates. Industry practice is to have a capacity utilisation of 80%-85% to avoid congestion. The throughput of the exit gate is 90 trucks per hour (see below) so the throughput of loading bays of 72 trucks per hour 72/90 x 100 = 80% capacity utilisation is just right. No congestion at dispatch. Hence 30 loading bays. (Big ports have 20-40).
Dispatch Throughput
Number of exit gates - 3
Number of dispatch = 4,000 ÷ 3 = 1,334 (2 gates clear 1,333 each, 1 gate clears 1.334)
Dispatch throughput = 90 trucks/hr (2 mins to clear one 3 trucks, therefore 1 hr clears 90).
The dispatch throughput constraints the loading operation. Increasing number of exit gates can increase its throughput which can in turn allow for increase in number loading bays to reduce total loading time. But the number of exit gates is constrained by the 3-lane main road. Increasing number of exit gates will create external congestion as 4 or more exits will merge into the 3 main lanes.
Total Transit time:
Transit time - average 90 minutes (on the low side).
Dispatch interval - 2 mins.
3 trucks are dispatched every 2 mins.
Therefore number of dispatches = 4,000 ÷ 3 = 1,333 and last dispatch with only 1 truck.
The last truck to reach destination = (1,334 - 1) x 2 min + 90 mins = 2,711 mins = 46 hrs.
Note: Theoretically, trucks need only a short distance behind each other so dispatch time is only a few seconds. The 2 minutes dispatch interval here is due to time to move to exit gantry and security checking.
Using Trains:
They will have dual systems - one standard gauge track, one another metre gauge track. Standard gauge track is for future interoperability for connection to Chinese and Malaysian rail systems. Metre gauge is for connection to the domestic rail system.
For ease of scheduling, it is expected that each vessel's cargo will use the same gauge. Most likely the smaller vessels will use the metre gauge and larger vessels the standard gauge.
One factor to consider is the dispatch time, that is, the interval between trains. Factors to consider are safe distance between trains, length and speed of trains, types of cargo, (freight trains require much more safe distance than passenger trains), etc. The dispatch time should not be more than the loading time otherwise there will be congestion. Dispatch time of 10-20 minutes is common for freight trains.
Clearly there is one choke point, ie the loading bays. The more loading bays, the faster the trains can load simultaneously and get out. There is no detail about how many loading bays there will be at Kra Landbridge. Again quite clearly, there is an optimum number of sidings for a short track of 90 km because there are only so many trains that can be running on the track at any time.
To determine best practice dispatch interval and number of sidings to avoid queuing
The main line ends up at a loading bay. To have additional loading bays, sidings are required. A siding is a passing loop or holding point where trains can wait to allow others to pass. So for example, 8 loading bays mean 1 mainline + 7 sidings.
The optimal dispatch interval provides a safe distance between trains. To prevent congestion at loading, the dispatch time must not exceed the loading time per train.
Dispatch interval ≤ loading time per train ÷ number of loading bays
Standard-gauge
Loading time = average 90 mins
Assume loading bays - 9
Therefore dispatch interval = 90 ÷ 9 = 10 mins
If 8 loading bays. Dispatch interval = 90 ÷ 8 ≈ 11.25 min.
So 10–12 min dispatch interval with 8–9 loading bays (ie 1 mainline + 7-8 sidings) is safe for single-track operation.
Meter-gauge
Loading time - average 75 mins
Assume loading bays - 8
Therefore dispatch interval = 75 ÷ 8 = 9.375 mins.
If 7 loading bays. Dispatch interval = 75 ÷ 7 ≈ 10.3 min.
So 10-11 mins dispatch interval with 7-8 loading bays (ie 1 mainline + 6-7 sidings) is safe for single-track operation.
Number of trains on the track at any time:
Tracks on train simultaneously = Travel time/Dispatch interval
Standard gauge
Travel time = 45 min
Dispatch interval = 10–12 min
- If dispatch = 12 min → 45 ÷ 12 ≈ 3.75 → 3–4 trains on track
Meter Gauge
Travel time = 90 min
Dispatch interval = 10–11
If dispatch = 11 min → 90 ÷ 11 ≈ 8.15 → 8-9 trains on track
Total Loading Time of Trains (for 4,000 TEU Vessel):
Standard gauge:
Loading per train - average 90 mins
No. of loading bays - 7
Number of TEU per train - 100
Number of trains needed - 40
6 loading bays process 6 trains each, 1 bay processes 4 trains .
Most used bay is the bottleneck.
Time taken to load = 6 x 90 min = 540 mins (9 hr
Metre gauge:
Loading per train - ave 75 mins
No. of loading bays - 4
Number of TEU per train - 55
Number of trains needed - 73
3 loading bays process 18 trains each and 1 processes 19 trains.
The most-used bay is the bottleneck.
Time taken to load = 19 x 75 mins = 23.75 hrs
Total Train Transit Time:
Total time = (Number of trains - 1) x (Dispatch interval) + (Travel time)
Standard-gauge
Dispatch time - 10 mins
Total trains - 40
Travel time - 45 mins
Total transit time = (40-1) x 10 + 45 = 390 + 45 = 435 mins (7.25 hrs)
Meter-gauge
Dispatch time - 10 mins.
Total trains - 73
Travel time - 90 mins.
Total transit time = (73-1) x 10 + 90 = 720 + 90 = 810 mins (13.5 hrs)
Check for congestion:
Standard-gauge
Loading bays - 7
Loading time - 1.5 hrs per train
Dispatch interval - 10 mins
Therefore dispatch throughput is 60 ÷ 10 = 6 trains per hour
1 loading bay processes 1.5 hr per train.
Which is 90 ÷ 60 = 0.6667 trains per hour.
Therefore throughput for 7 loading bays = 0.6667 x 7 = 4.7 trains per hour.
Capacity utilisation is 4.7 ÷ 6 x 100 = 78%
There is no congestion at dispatch. 78% is below port practice of about 80%. To increase loading bays to 8 would increase throughput to 5.3 trains per hr which is 93% capacity utilisation. Too risky.
Metre-gauge
Loading bays - 4
Loading time - 1.25 hrs per train
Dispatch time - 10 mins.
Therefore dispatch throughput is 60 ÷ 10 = 6 trains per hour
1 loading bay processes 1.25 hr per train.
Which is 75 ÷ 60 = 1.25 trains per hour.
Therefore throughput for 6 loading bays = 1.25 x 4 = 5 trains per hour.
Capacity utilisation is 5 ÷ 6 x 100 = 83%
There is no congestion at dispatch. Capacility utilisation is 83%. A bit on the high side. Let's take it.
(B) DEPOSITING CONTAINERS TO THE YARD OF DISPATCHING PORT
Using Trucks:
At Entry Point:
Number of entry gates - 4
Security clearance - 2 minutes per truck.
Eack gate takes 2 mins to clear a truck, 1 hour clears 30 trucks.
Therefore Throughput for 4 gates = 30 x 4 = 120 trucks per hr
Capacity utilisation: The trucks are coming at 90 trucks per hour. The capacity utilisation is 90/120 x 100 = 70%. There is no external congestion.
Total downloading time at yard:
Time to download per truck - average 7.5 mins.
Number of downloading bays - 30
20 bays download 133 trucks, 10 bays download 134 trucks.
The bay that downloads most is the bottle-neck
Total time to download = 134 x 7.7 mins = 1,005 mins (16.75 hrs)
Capacity utilisation:
Each bay takes 7.5 mins to download a truck, 1 hour downloads 8 tucks.
Therefore downloading throughput for 30 bays is 8 x 40 = 240 trucks per hr.
The trucks from Entry Gates are coming at 120 trucks per hr. The capacity utilisation is 120/240 x 100 = 50%. There is no risk of congestion.
Using Trains:
Train operations at the ports are based on symmetrical operations. The importing and the exporting terminals have similar number of loading/unloading bays and processing times. Thus capacity utilisation is theoretically 100%. It is normal to have redundancies for built-in buffers to meet delays. Thus they have extra sidings.
Thus total train-to-yard downloading time is :
Standard gauge - 9 hrs
Metre gauge - 23.75 hrs
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The Kra Landbridge is killed by the limitation of its truck and train transit throughput.The discussion on time saved and cost comparison is moot. The landbridge can barely support the transfer of one bigger vessel's cargoes. There are easily about 150 container vessels plying the Straits of Malacca daily. 60%-70% of these are East-West trade. The ports at Ranong on the West and Chumphon on the East may have sufficient terminals and berths to cater to the traffic, but they are going to have hundreds of thousands of TEUs queuing up to make the land transfer. It simply cannot support the scale envisaged.
The Thai OTP announced the ministry's approval of the Kra Isthmus Landbridge project on Aug 22 but it needed cabinet to greenlight it. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was removed as Prime Minister by the Constitutional Court on August 29. It is believed cabinet approved the project in the week Paetongtarn was removed.
Although it was her predecessor Srettha Thavisin who aggressively revitalised the Kra shortcut idea, it was nevertheless Paetongtarn's administration that approved it. The Kra shortcut idea seems like a curse for the Shinawatra family. Just like her, her father Thaksin, was ousted as Prime Minister during the height of publicity for the project in the 2000's.
Let's hope there is no repeat of a Temasek style attempt to scuttle another Kra shortcut project. Think-Tanks predominantly look at geopolitical spheres and its politico-economic impact and advises the government accordingly. As I mentioned, a Kra Canal there never will be, for national security reasons. And the math I present here, a Kra Landbridge will be a bobo. I have no idea what Singapore Think-Tanks fed to the government that germinated the Temasek buyout of Thaksin's Shin Corp decades ago, and what they advise now. There was a commentary in January 2024 by Ian Storey, a senior fellow of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, one of Singapore's Think-Tanks. You can read it here. Unfortunately it is the usual bla-bla with no specifics and one is none the wiser whether the Kra Landbridge will sink Singapore port.
For far too long both the Kra Canal and Landbridge has been over-hyped as a threat to Singapore's position as a trans-shipment hub. With my explainer here, you can take the math to the bank. Singaporeans can sleep soundly. Never fear. Just keep improving our entreport and auxillary services, more state-of-the-art efficiency, more business-friendly and most important of all, more cost-effective.
*********************
THE DETAILED COMPUTATION.
The illustration is based on the example of a smaller vessel with 4,000 TEU.
(A) HAULING CONTAINERS FROM THE YARD OF RECEIVING PORT
Using Trucks:
Loading time per truck per TEU is 15-30 mins.
Total time required to load an entire vessel's cargo depends on the number of loading bays. The larger ports have about 20-40 loading bays per terminal. Let's assume Kra Landmine has 30.
Transit time is 1.5 hours to 2.25 hours depending on weather and road conditions. The road system is 6 lanes, 3 lanes Eastbound, 3 lanes Westbound.
Calculating total loading time:
Loading per truck per TEU - average 25 minutes.
Total trucks - 4,000
Loading bays - 30 (parallel, automated).
20 bays handle 133 trucks and 10 bays handle 134 trucks each.
The biggest number of trucks is the bottleneck.
Throughput = 30 trucks per 25 mins = 72 trucks per hour.
Total loading time = 134 x 25 mins = 55.9 hrs
Note: The more loading bays, the lower the total loading time. The constraint is the exit gates. Industry practice is to have a capacity utilisation of 80%-85% to avoid congestion. The throughput of the exit gate is 90 trucks per hour (see below) so the throughput of loading bays of 72 trucks per hour 72/90 x 100 = 80% capacity utilisation is just right. No congestion at dispatch. Hence 30 loading bays. (Big ports have 20-40).
Dispatch Throughput
Number of exit gates - 3
Number of dispatch = 4,000 ÷ 3 = 1,334 (2 gates clear 1,333 each, 1 gate clears 1.334)
Dispatch throughput = 90 trucks/hr (2 mins to clear one 3 trucks, therefore 1 hr clears 90).
The dispatch throughput constraints the loading operation. Increasing number of exit gates can increase its throughput which can in turn allow for increase in number loading bays to reduce total loading time. But the number of exit gates is constrained by the 3-lane main road. Increasing number of exit gates will create external congestion as 4 or more exits will merge into the 3 main lanes.
Total Transit time:
Transit time - average 90 minutes (on the low side).
Dispatch interval - 2 mins.
3 trucks are dispatched every 2 mins.
Therefore number of dispatches = 4,000 ÷ 3 = 1,333 and last dispatch with only 1 truck.
The last truck to reach destination = (1,334 - 1) x 2 min + 90 mins = 2,711 mins = 46 hrs.
Note: Theoretically, trucks need only a short distance behind each other so dispatch time is only a few seconds. The 2 minutes dispatch interval here is due to time to move to exit gantry and security checking.
Using Trains:
They will have dual systems - one standard gauge track, one another metre gauge track. Standard gauge track is for future interoperability for connection to Chinese and Malaysian rail systems. Metre gauge is for connection to the domestic rail system.
For ease of scheduling, it is expected that each vessel's cargo will use the same gauge. Most likely the smaller vessels will use the metre gauge and larger vessels the standard gauge.
One factor to consider is the dispatch time, that is, the interval between trains. Factors to consider are safe distance between trains, length and speed of trains, types of cargo, (freight trains require much more safe distance than passenger trains), etc. The dispatch time should not be more than the loading time otherwise there will be congestion. Dispatch time of 10-20 minutes is common for freight trains.
Clearly there is one choke point, ie the loading bays. The more loading bays, the faster the trains can load simultaneously and get out. There is no detail about how many loading bays there will be at Kra Landbridge. Again quite clearly, there is an optimum number of sidings for a short track of 90 km because there are only so many trains that can be running on the track at any time.
To determine best practice dispatch interval and number of sidings to avoid queuing
The main line ends up at a loading bay. To have additional loading bays, sidings are required. A siding is a passing loop or holding point where trains can wait to allow others to pass. So for example, 8 loading bays mean 1 mainline + 7 sidings.
The optimal dispatch interval provides a safe distance between trains. To prevent congestion at loading, the dispatch time must not exceed the loading time per train.
Dispatch interval ≤ loading time per train ÷ number of loading bays
Standard-gauge
Loading time = average 90 mins
Assume loading bays - 9
Therefore dispatch interval = 90 ÷ 9 = 10 mins
If 8 loading bays. Dispatch interval = 90 ÷ 8 ≈ 11.25 min.
So 10–12 min dispatch interval with 8–9 loading bays (ie 1 mainline + 7-8 sidings) is safe for single-track operation.
Meter-gauge
Loading time - average 75 mins
Assume loading bays - 8
Therefore dispatch interval = 75 ÷ 8 = 9.375 mins.
If 7 loading bays. Dispatch interval = 75 ÷ 7 ≈ 10.3 min.
So 10-11 mins dispatch interval with 7-8 loading bays (ie 1 mainline + 6-7 sidings) is safe for single-track operation.
Number of trains on the track at any time:
Tracks on train simultaneously = Travel time/Dispatch interval
Standard gauge
Travel time = 45 min
Dispatch interval = 10–12 min
- If dispatch = 12 min → 45 ÷ 12 ≈ 3.75 → 3–4 trains on track
Meter Gauge
Travel time = 90 min
Dispatch interval = 10–11
If dispatch = 11 min → 90 ÷ 11 ≈ 8.15 → 8-9 trains on track
Total Loading Time of Trains (for 4,000 TEU Vessel):
Standard gauge:
Loading per train - average 90 mins
No. of loading bays - 7
Number of TEU per train - 100
Number of trains needed - 40
6 loading bays process 6 trains each, 1 bay processes 4 trains .
Most used bay is the bottleneck.
Time taken to load = 6 x 90 min = 540 mins (9 hr
Metre gauge:
Loading per train - ave 75 mins
No. of loading bays - 4
Number of TEU per train - 55
Number of trains needed - 73
3 loading bays process 18 trains each and 1 processes 19 trains.
The most-used bay is the bottleneck.
Time taken to load = 19 x 75 mins = 23.75 hrs
Total Train Transit Time:
Total time = (Number of trains - 1) x (Dispatch interval) + (Travel time)
Standard-gauge
Dispatch time - 10 mins
Total trains - 40
Travel time - 45 mins
Total transit time = (40-1) x 10 + 45 = 390 + 45 = 435 mins (7.25 hrs)
Meter-gauge
Dispatch time - 10 mins.
Total trains - 73
Travel time - 90 mins.
Total transit time = (73-1) x 10 + 90 = 720 + 90 = 810 mins (13.5 hrs)
Check for congestion:
Standard-gauge
Loading bays - 7
Loading time - 1.5 hrs per train
Dispatch interval - 10 mins
Therefore dispatch throughput is 60 ÷ 10 = 6 trains per hour
1 loading bay processes 1.5 hr per train.
Which is 90 ÷ 60 = 0.6667 trains per hour.
Therefore throughput for 7 loading bays = 0.6667 x 7 = 4.7 trains per hour.
Capacity utilisation is 4.7 ÷ 6 x 100 = 78%
There is no congestion at dispatch. 78% is below port practice of about 80%. To increase loading bays to 8 would increase throughput to 5.3 trains per hr which is 93% capacity utilisation. Too risky.
Metre-gauge
Loading bays - 4
Loading time - 1.25 hrs per train
Dispatch time - 10 mins.
Therefore dispatch throughput is 60 ÷ 10 = 6 trains per hour
1 loading bay processes 1.25 hr per train.
Which is 75 ÷ 60 = 1.25 trains per hour.
Therefore throughput for 6 loading bays = 1.25 x 4 = 5 trains per hour.
Capacity utilisation is 5 ÷ 6 x 100 = 83%
There is no congestion at dispatch. Capacility utilisation is 83%. A bit on the high side. Let's take it.
(B) DEPOSITING CONTAINERS TO THE YARD OF DISPATCHING PORT
Using Trucks:
At Entry Point:
Number of entry gates - 4
Security clearance - 2 minutes per truck.
Eack gate takes 2 mins to clear a truck, 1 hour clears 30 trucks.
Therefore Throughput for 4 gates = 30 x 4 = 120 trucks per hr
Capacity utilisation: The trucks are coming at 90 trucks per hour. The capacity utilisation is 90/120 x 100 = 70%. There is no external congestion.
Total downloading time at yard:
Time to download per truck - average 7.5 mins.
Number of downloading bays - 30
20 bays download 133 trucks, 10 bays download 134 trucks.
The bay that downloads most is the bottle-neck
Total time to download = 134 x 7.7 mins = 1,005 mins (16.75 hrs)
Capacity utilisation:
Each bay takes 7.5 mins to download a truck, 1 hour downloads 8 tucks.
Therefore downloading throughput for 30 bays is 8 x 40 = 240 trucks per hr.
The trucks from Entry Gates are coming at 120 trucks per hr. The capacity utilisation is 120/240 x 100 = 50%. There is no risk of congestion.
Using Trains:
Train operations at the ports are based on symmetrical operations. The importing and the exporting terminals have similar number of loading/unloading bays and processing times. Thus capacity utilisation is theoretically 100%. It is normal to have redundancies for built-in buffers to meet delays. Thus they have extra sidings.
Thus total train-to-yard downloading time is :
Standard gauge - 9 hrs
Metre gauge - 23.75 hrs
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