CHINA'S DEMOGRAPHIC TIME-BOMB - THE CHART THAT SCARES BEIJING'S PLANNERS
For non-professionals trying to figure out Chinese data, the task is daunting due to difficulties of language, access to info, and certain degree of unreliability of official information. Much information comes from Western analysts, many of which are tainted anti-China propaganda. Another important source is from Chinese dissident diaspora many of whom reportedly have contacts with some official channels. Again, there is need to be wary of anti-China propaganda slant.
One channel I follow is Lei, a US-based Chinese. She likes to talk about the "disappearing Chinese people", her fear language for the phenomenon of a declining population. Recently she cited the closure of primary schools in China with great alarm.
According to Lei, primary schools in China shrank from about 553,600 in 2000 to 177,600 in 2016 (end of one-child policy) and 143,500 in 2023. These are alarming figures and the auto reaction is to attribute it to the declining population. Lei sees millions of primary school kids disappearing. The closure of schools from 533,600 to 143,500 is a 74% drop. Does this reflect a population of primary school kids decreased by 74% as Lei seems to suggest?
To cross-check Lei's data, I checked with Grok for a chart. I asked for a much earlier start point bearing in mind China's one-two child policy was applied for the years 1979 to 2015. The data point at 2000 and 2016 matches Lei's bar charts For the year 2023 Grok has about 10,000-15,000 more schools than Lei.
With primary school going age 6 to 11 years, and the one child policy starting in 1979, we can expect the reduction of primary schools kids taking impact from 1985 onwards. Yet Grok's chart shows the sharp decline started long before 1985 and continued at roughly the same rate all the way to 2016. This suggests the one child policy is not the cause for this period.
The massive closure of primary schools from 1975 to 2016 was due primarily to two reasons.
* First, there was a consolidation of schools in rural regions for more efficient use of resources.
* Secondly, a lot of rural schools closed in response to the massive urbanisation due to China's booming economy.
After 2016 the school restructuring situation normalised and the lower rate of closure is more aligned with impact of the one-child policy.
This piqued my curiosity for the wider impact of China's population due to the one child policy. At the same time, I felt understanding China's population projection might give some leads as to Singapore's situation coming out of a similar birth control "stop-at-two" policy in 1972.
I used Grok, ChatGPT and Deepseek for comparison. I asked for a 100 year chart from 1979 to 2079 of China's demographic trend taking into consideration data parameters set by me and recognising the population control policy.
I asked for a deep analysis. Both Deepseek and ChatGPT churned out the report in quick time. Grok took almost 10 minutes and it wasn't because of network issues since it was feeding me infor about what it was doing all the while. Deepseek does not provide chart. I settled on Grok as it seemed to have done heavy lifting. However, it is not so straight forward. I had to provide parameters for how to generate the chart in the way I wanted to make it meaningful. I finally got the chart I wanted. This is the chart that gives Beijing economic planners sleepless nights.
China's population was growing rapidly doubling between 1949 (540 million) and 1979 (969 million) under Mao Zedong's policies. China enforced a birth control policy from 1979 to 2015 which limited urban families to one child and rural families to two, It was a landmark demographic intervention aimed at curbing population growth to alleviate economic and resource pressures.
This post analyses the impact of the birth control policy on four key metrics — total population, demographics by age, average life span, and average number of children per family — from 1979 to 2024, and project the trends to 2079. The analysis draws on data from reliable sources, including the United Nations World Population Prospects, World Bank, and Chinese census data, to provide a comprehensive view of China's demographic trajectory.
Total Population:
In 1979, China's population was approximately 969,005,000. Without the one-child policy, China's population would have exploded to 1.65 million by 2016. The one-child policy (1979-2015) slowed the growth rate to approximately 1,387,790,000 in 2016, an increase of about 43% over 37 years.
The United Nations World Population Prospects projects China's population to peak around 2030 at approximately 1.45 billion and then decline to around 1.1 billion by 2079.
The decline is driven by:
* Total fertility rate (TFR) fell from 2.6 in 1979 to 1.4 in 2079, well below the replacement level of 2.1. Despite the relaxation of the one-child policy in 2016 (allowing two children) and further in 2021 (allowing three children), birth rates have not significantly increased due to economic pressures, such as high living and childcare costs, and social shifts toward individualism. In this respect, China's experience mirrors that of all developed countries.
* An aging population that reduces the number of women of childbearing age.
* An imbalance of gender with Chinese preference for male descendants which had great impact during the one-child policy years, leading to lesser marriages and increase of unmarried males unable to find a spouse.
* The decline is offset by longer life expectancy.
Life Expectancy:
The increase of about 10.9 years in life expectancy, from 65 in 1979 to 80 today reflects improvements in healthcare, nutrition, and living standards, which were indirectly supported by the one-child policy's resource allocation benefits. Life expectancy is expected to continue rising, potentially reaching 85 years or more by 2079, driven by ongoing advancements in medical technology and public health (The Lancet Public Health).
Fertility Rate:
In the 1950s to 1970s, China had a high Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of about 6 to 6.5 per woman. Once the birth control policies kicked in, TFR dropped sharply and immediately to 2.6 in 1979 and the sharp decline continued to 1.65 by 2000. It levelled off slightly from 2000 to 2024 to 1.5. It is projected to stabilise and level at 1.4 all the way to 2079. The one-child policy directly caused this decline, reducing the TFR below the replacement level of 2.1, leading to a shrinking population over time. The TFR is expected to remain low, around 1.5 children per woman, due to economic pressures and changing social norms (UN World Population Prospects).
Age Demographics:
1-14 years
In the 1950s the baby boom saw this segment hit 37.4% of the population. The Great Leap Famine reduced births and increased mortality (1959-1961). Due to youth dependency in an agricultural economy, high birth resumed on an upward trend despite the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), rising to 42.5% in 1970s. When birth control was implemented in 1979, proportion of childred dropped by more than half to about 18% by 2016. As TFR continues to decline further, proportion of children is expected to drop to 15% by 2030. This is projected to decline to 10% by 2079 due to downward trend of Total Population.
15-64 years
The distribution of China's working-age group in the period 1979 to 2079 takes a parabolic shape. It formed about 65% in 1979 of the population rising to about 75% in the years 2010-2016 and then dipping to a forecasted 55% in 2079.
A population distribution of 75% in the working class is known in economics as the economic "sweet spot" because (1) a high share of economic workers means a potential for high economic growth; (2) Fewer children and elderly to support means more resources per capita.
Is it a coincidence that many analysts consider China reached the apex of its economic boom roughly in the years 2010-2015, exactly when it had the economic "sweet spot".
65+ years
Coming out of a 3rd world, China's vastly improved health services caused an increase in life expectancy. As people live longer, the aged group expands in the demographics. China population was slowly ageing from about 4.5% in 1979 to 8% by 2010. It then took a more positive co-relation to the Life Expectancy line and expanded sharply to about 15% by 2024. The trend line is projected to intensify with the elderly population potentially reaching 35% by 2079, posing significant challenges for social services and economic productivity (UN World Population Prospects).
The chart that scares the Beijing planners:
The chart clearly shows China is long past its democratic "sweet spot" of 2010 to 2016 where it had a large working-age group of 75% with fewer dependents which meant high savings, cheap labour, explosive urbanisation with rural surplus labour migrating to cities to boost productivity. The demographics paying dividends.
China has now moved into the post-Demographic Dividend phase which is the Demographic Drag. A decreasing working force and an exploding ageing population means shrinking labour force and rising healthcare and pension burdens.
What this means is China's past model of labour-driven and youth-fueled growth is over.
This is exacerbated by concurrent failures in their other economic models which drove the success of the past several decades:
Export-led model:
After WTO accession (2001), it's cheap labour, scale and integration into the global supply chain made China the world's factory. This is now over because of several factors - rising wages means loss of cost advantage, global reshoring, friend-shoring and decoupling, tariff war, tech restrictions, etc. The model is strained due to dependence on external demand and open globalisation.
Infrastructure and real estate growth model:
This contributed massively to GDP in the past. Local government are debt driven. They are funded by land sales. A dead real estate market means no more funds for government spending. The market is suffering from overbuilt cities, ghost towns. Housing demand has peaked. Building developers collapse with half-complete projects. The middle income caught with mortgages to pay for developments that has stopped. Massive middle-income families' savings invested in real estate have been wiped off. This model on land-based finance and debt-fueled construction is now broken.
Technology as a Replacement Engine model:
This model is market-led by innovation which is restrained by political priorities. State crackdown on private tech (eg Ant group IPO) stifles entrepreneur risk taking. US sanctions choke off access to advanced semiconductors.
Domestic consumption model:
China has been trying unsuccessfully for the past 20 years to move away from export-driven to a domestic consumption economy. There is insufficient consumer investment capacity and local governments are high in debt, unable to spur domestic consumption with subsidies. Ageing population means more savers less spending. High youth unemployment, declining consumer confidence, and weak social safety net means very low propensity to spend. Massive amount of savings in real estate have been destroyed as the industry collapsed. This model cannot take off. It is underpowered despite policy goals.
China's debt situation:
China is debt laden (latest estimates):
* Central government - US$4.48 trillion.
* Local Government - US$45.18 trillion
* Household debt - US$10.5 trillion
* Corporate debt - US$24.7 trillion
* Banks + Financial institutions - US$68 trillion
China's debt situation is a major constraint on the kinds of structural reforms it can pursue, especially those needed to shift from investment-led to consumer-driven growth. China is in a 'Debt Trap" situation, but not in the traditional sense of debt servicing overtaking debt payment :
* Local governments are trapped - they rely on land sales and debt to fund services. Any reforms like property tax or reducing real estate dependence would cut off their revenue, expose hidden debts, trigger defaults or social unrest. Reforms stall. Model keeps running.
* Banks (especially government-owned) are trapped - They are overexposed to unproductive loans (real estate developers, local financing platforms, zombie state-owned-enterprises). Structural reforms would force these debts to be written off, risking bank losses, public confidence crisis, massive bailouts needed.
* Households are trapped - they need to spend to get consumer model going. But households have massive mortgage loans, social safety net is weak, cost of living rising, unemployment rising. To unleash consumption China needs to expand social welfare, tax the rich, shift resources away from public sector - all politically difficult.
* State capitalism is trapped - China needs to get rid of state-owned enterprises which crowd out private firms and soak up credit inefficiently. Reforms mean cutting state protection, bankruptcies and creative destruction. Means mass layoffs, social instability, loss of party control.
* China is trapped -- It hasn't collapsed, but it can't move forward easily either. It's not just a financial issue, but more dangerously, it is a political and institutional trap. China must choose between stability and transformation. At the moment, it is choosing stability.
Conclusion:
China faces tremendous challenges which requires deep social and institutional structural reforms. Structural reforms require political liberation or power-sharing for which a one-party State model simply has no political will.
Meanwhile China is running out of options with the ticking demographic time bomb. Most experts say once the TFR drops below 1.5, the situation is irreversible. Many demographers have said China reached this point of no return somewhere by 2010
The intersection of the demographics and the failure economic models described above explains how precarious a situation China is in right now. This is probably the primary background for the political infighting in the CCP leadership lately. There is the reforms group who understand China is running out of time for reforms to change course, and they are up against President Xi's group who are focused on geopolitical power.
To avoid being called "ang mog tua kee", I dispense with Western views and quote only from reknown Chinese demographers:
One channel I follow is Lei, a US-based Chinese. She likes to talk about the "disappearing Chinese people", her fear language for the phenomenon of a declining population. Recently she cited the closure of primary schools in China with great alarm.
With primary school going age 6 to 11 years, and the one child policy starting in 1979, we can expect the reduction of primary schools kids taking impact from 1985 onwards. Yet Grok's chart shows the sharp decline started long before 1985 and continued at roughly the same rate all the way to 2016. This suggests the one child policy is not the cause for this period.
The massive closure of primary schools from 1975 to 2016 was due primarily to two reasons.
* First, there was a consolidation of schools in rural regions for more efficient use of resources.
* Secondly, a lot of rural schools closed in response to the massive urbanisation due to China's booming economy.
After 2016 the school restructuring situation normalised and the lower rate of closure is more aligned with impact of the one-child policy.
This piqued my curiosity for the wider impact of China's population due to the one child policy. At the same time, I felt understanding China's population projection might give some leads as to Singapore's situation coming out of a similar birth control "stop-at-two" policy in 1972.
I used Grok, ChatGPT and Deepseek for comparison. I asked for a 100 year chart from 1979 to 2079 of China's demographic trend taking into consideration data parameters set by me and recognising the population control policy.
I asked for a deep analysis. Both Deepseek and ChatGPT churned out the report in quick time. Grok took almost 10 minutes and it wasn't because of network issues since it was feeding me infor about what it was doing all the while. Deepseek does not provide chart. I settled on Grok as it seemed to have done heavy lifting. However, it is not so straight forward. I had to provide parameters for how to generate the chart in the way I wanted to make it meaningful. I finally got the chart I wanted. This is the chart that gives Beijing economic planners sleepless nights.
This post analyses the impact of the birth control policy on four key metrics — total population, demographics by age, average life span, and average number of children per family — from 1979 to 2024, and project the trends to 2079. The analysis draws on data from reliable sources, including the United Nations World Population Prospects, World Bank, and Chinese census data, to provide a comprehensive view of China's demographic trajectory.
Total Population:
In 1979, China's population was approximately 969,005,000. Without the one-child policy, China's population would have exploded to 1.65 million by 2016. The one-child policy (1979-2015) slowed the growth rate to approximately 1,387,790,000 in 2016, an increase of about 43% over 37 years.
The United Nations World Population Prospects projects China's population to peak around 2030 at approximately 1.45 billion and then decline to around 1.1 billion by 2079.
The decline is driven by:
* Total fertility rate (TFR) fell from 2.6 in 1979 to 1.4 in 2079, well below the replacement level of 2.1. Despite the relaxation of the one-child policy in 2016 (allowing two children) and further in 2021 (allowing three children), birth rates have not significantly increased due to economic pressures, such as high living and childcare costs, and social shifts toward individualism. In this respect, China's experience mirrors that of all developed countries.
* An aging population that reduces the number of women of childbearing age.
* An imbalance of gender with Chinese preference for male descendants which had great impact during the one-child policy years, leading to lesser marriages and increase of unmarried males unable to find a spouse.
* The decline is offset by longer life expectancy.
Life Expectancy:
The increase of about 10.9 years in life expectancy, from 65 in 1979 to 80 today reflects improvements in healthcare, nutrition, and living standards, which were indirectly supported by the one-child policy's resource allocation benefits. Life expectancy is expected to continue rising, potentially reaching 85 years or more by 2079, driven by ongoing advancements in medical technology and public health (The Lancet Public Health).
Fertility Rate:
In the 1950s to 1970s, China had a high Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of about 6 to 6.5 per woman. Once the birth control policies kicked in, TFR dropped sharply and immediately to 2.6 in 1979 and the sharp decline continued to 1.65 by 2000. It levelled off slightly from 2000 to 2024 to 1.5. It is projected to stabilise and level at 1.4 all the way to 2079. The one-child policy directly caused this decline, reducing the TFR below the replacement level of 2.1, leading to a shrinking population over time. The TFR is expected to remain low, around 1.5 children per woman, due to economic pressures and changing social norms (UN World Population Prospects).
Age Demographics:
1-14 years
In the 1950s the baby boom saw this segment hit 37.4% of the population. The Great Leap Famine reduced births and increased mortality (1959-1961). Due to youth dependency in an agricultural economy, high birth resumed on an upward trend despite the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), rising to 42.5% in 1970s. When birth control was implemented in 1979, proportion of childred dropped by more than half to about 18% by 2016. As TFR continues to decline further, proportion of children is expected to drop to 15% by 2030. This is projected to decline to 10% by 2079 due to downward trend of Total Population.
15-64 years
The distribution of China's working-age group in the period 1979 to 2079 takes a parabolic shape. It formed about 65% in 1979 of the population rising to about 75% in the years 2010-2016 and then dipping to a forecasted 55% in 2079.
A population distribution of 75% in the working class is known in economics as the economic "sweet spot" because (1) a high share of economic workers means a potential for high economic growth; (2) Fewer children and elderly to support means more resources per capita.
Is it a coincidence that many analysts consider China reached the apex of its economic boom roughly in the years 2010-2015, exactly when it had the economic "sweet spot".
65+ years
Coming out of a 3rd world, China's vastly improved health services caused an increase in life expectancy. As people live longer, the aged group expands in the demographics. China population was slowly ageing from about 4.5% in 1979 to 8% by 2010. It then took a more positive co-relation to the Life Expectancy line and expanded sharply to about 15% by 2024. The trend line is projected to intensify with the elderly population potentially reaching 35% by 2079, posing significant challenges for social services and economic productivity (UN World Population Prospects).
The chart that scares the Beijing planners:
The chart clearly shows China is long past its democratic "sweet spot" of 2010 to 2016 where it had a large working-age group of 75% with fewer dependents which meant high savings, cheap labour, explosive urbanisation with rural surplus labour migrating to cities to boost productivity. The demographics paying dividends.
China has now moved into the post-Demographic Dividend phase which is the Demographic Drag. A decreasing working force and an exploding ageing population means shrinking labour force and rising healthcare and pension burdens.
What this means is China's past model of labour-driven and youth-fueled growth is over.
This is exacerbated by concurrent failures in their other economic models which drove the success of the past several decades:
Export-led model:
After WTO accession (2001), it's cheap labour, scale and integration into the global supply chain made China the world's factory. This is now over because of several factors - rising wages means loss of cost advantage, global reshoring, friend-shoring and decoupling, tariff war, tech restrictions, etc. The model is strained due to dependence on external demand and open globalisation.
Infrastructure and real estate growth model:
This contributed massively to GDP in the past. Local government are debt driven. They are funded by land sales. A dead real estate market means no more funds for government spending. The market is suffering from overbuilt cities, ghost towns. Housing demand has peaked. Building developers collapse with half-complete projects. The middle income caught with mortgages to pay for developments that has stopped. Massive middle-income families' savings invested in real estate have been wiped off. This model on land-based finance and debt-fueled construction is now broken.
Technology as a Replacement Engine model:
This model is market-led by innovation which is restrained by political priorities. State crackdown on private tech (eg Ant group IPO) stifles entrepreneur risk taking. US sanctions choke off access to advanced semiconductors.
Domestic consumption model:
China has been trying unsuccessfully for the past 20 years to move away from export-driven to a domestic consumption economy. There is insufficient consumer investment capacity and local governments are high in debt, unable to spur domestic consumption with subsidies. Ageing population means more savers less spending. High youth unemployment, declining consumer confidence, and weak social safety net means very low propensity to spend. Massive amount of savings in real estate have been destroyed as the industry collapsed. This model cannot take off. It is underpowered despite policy goals.
China's debt situation:
China is debt laden (latest estimates):
* Central government - US$4.48 trillion.
* Local Government - US$45.18 trillion
* Household debt - US$10.5 trillion
* Corporate debt - US$24.7 trillion
* Banks + Financial institutions - US$68 trillion
China's debt situation is a major constraint on the kinds of structural reforms it can pursue, especially those needed to shift from investment-led to consumer-driven growth. China is in a 'Debt Trap" situation, but not in the traditional sense of debt servicing overtaking debt payment :
* Local governments are trapped - they rely on land sales and debt to fund services. Any reforms like property tax or reducing real estate dependence would cut off their revenue, expose hidden debts, trigger defaults or social unrest. Reforms stall. Model keeps running.
* Banks (especially government-owned) are trapped - They are overexposed to unproductive loans (real estate developers, local financing platforms, zombie state-owned-enterprises). Structural reforms would force these debts to be written off, risking bank losses, public confidence crisis, massive bailouts needed.
* Households are trapped - they need to spend to get consumer model going. But households have massive mortgage loans, social safety net is weak, cost of living rising, unemployment rising. To unleash consumption China needs to expand social welfare, tax the rich, shift resources away from public sector - all politically difficult.
* State capitalism is trapped - China needs to get rid of state-owned enterprises which crowd out private firms and soak up credit inefficiently. Reforms mean cutting state protection, bankruptcies and creative destruction. Means mass layoffs, social instability, loss of party control.
* China is trapped -- It hasn't collapsed, but it can't move forward easily either. It's not just a financial issue, but more dangerously, it is a political and institutional trap. China must choose between stability and transformation. At the moment, it is choosing stability.
Conclusion:
China faces tremendous challenges which requires deep social and institutional structural reforms. Structural reforms require political liberation or power-sharing for which a one-party State model simply has no political will.
Meanwhile China is running out of options with the ticking demographic time bomb. Most experts say once the TFR drops below 1.5, the situation is irreversible. Many demographers have said China reached this point of no return somewhere by 2010
The intersection of the demographics and the failure economic models described above explains how precarious a situation China is in right now. This is probably the primary background for the political infighting in the CCP leadership lately. There is the reforms group who understand China is running out of time for reforms to change course, and they are up against President Xi's group who are focused on geopolitical power.
To avoid being called "ang mog tua kee", I dispense with Western views and quote only from reknown Chinese demographers:
"China's demographic structure has already solidified ... Even if fertility rebounds slightly, the population decline is irreversible"
Yi Fuxian
"The demographic trend is now locked in. What lies ahead is a long-term challenge of population ageing and shrinking with no easy solution."
Wang Feng
"China must now prepare for a future of demographic contraction ... the turning point has already passed."
Cai Fang
Yi Fuxian
"The demographic trend is now locked in. What lies ahead is a long-term challenge of population ageing and shrinking with no easy solution."
Wang Feng
"China must now prepare for a future of demographic contraction ... the turning point has already passed."
Cai Fang
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